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Redefining the Rights of Undocumented Workers
Abstract
Should a nation extend legal rights to those who enter the country illegally? The Supreme Court recently
addressed this question when it held that unauthorized immigrants who are fired illegally for unionizing
cannot recover monetary remedies. This has led to a significant decline in employment protections for
unauthorized immigrants beyond the unionized sector. For example, some courts now question whether
unauthorized immigrants can receive full remedies for sexual harassment, workplace discrimination, or on-
the-job injuries.
Scholars have criticized these losses but have yet to formulate a coherent framework for evaluating the
employment rights of unauthorized immigrants. This article does so by distilling and applying several core
principles at issue when employment laws conflict with immigration laws. I begin by explaining how the text
and purpose of selected immigration and employment statutes show that Congress never intended to restrict
unauthorized immigrants’ employment rights. Remedial restrictions not only harm the workplace protections
at issue, they fail to discourage illegal immigration. Thus, neither legislative intent nor national immigration
goals justify limiting the workplace remedies available to unauthorized immigrants.
Although the future rights of unauthorized workers will turn partly on the issues of statutory purpose and
immigration policy discussed in the early sections of the article, equally important are the consequences of
diminished rights. Accordingly, the article concludes by explaining why restricting workplace protections
based on status harms citizens as well as immigrants. Cunningham-Parmeter contends that employment
protections are “rights of partial inclusion” that reflect a distinctive sphere - the workplace - where
unauthorized immigrants should be placed on par with citizens in pursuing collective interests. In contrast to
arguments that favor limiting resources to lawful residents, partial inclusion explains how employment
protections can effectively preserve national identity while simultaneously enhancing unauthorized
immigrants’ incentives for social investment. In doing so, partial inclusion furthers the community’s self-
definition, while providing unauthorized immigrants with a sense of belonging in a world increasingly focused
on their exclusion.
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INTRODUCTION 
Unauthorized immigrants live in precarious times.  American 
demand for inexpensive goods draws international migrants to our 
factories and fields.  Developing nations encourage their people to 
work in the United States.  As they are pushed and pulled toward the 
country,1 immigrants arrive in the United States to find armed 
Minutemen at the border and a growing public distaste for the 
unauthorized arrivals.2  They are wanted yet disdained, needed yet 
derided. 
Most Americans and the immigrants themselves would be surprised 
to learn that these “lawbreakers” receive a host of legal protections 
once they cross the border.3  The extent of those rights falls along a 
sliding scale of status.  From the unauthorized immigrant,4 to the 
lawful permanent resident, to the naturalized citizen, a person’s 
basket of rights fills as his immigration status formalizes.   
The naturalized citizen can vote and participate on a jury; the 
temporary worker cannot.5  The long-term resident alien can claim 
public benefits; the unauthorized immigrant cannot.6  But even 
unauthorized immigrants—those who stand at the bottom of the 
status scale—enjoy certain rights.  For example, they are “persons” 
under the Constitution who enjoy equal protection and due process 
of law.7 
                                                          
 1. See Howard F. Chang, The Immigration Paradox:  Poverty, Distributive Justice, and 
Liberal Egalitarianism, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 759, 760–61 (2003) (discussing migration 
trends); see also JEFFREY S. PASSEL, THE SIZE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE 
UNAUTHORIZED MIGRANT POPULATION IN THE U.S. i–ii (2006) (same). 
 2. See DAVID JACOBSEN, RIGHTS ACROSS BORDERS:  IMMIGRATION AND THE DECLINE 
OF CITIZENSHIP 42 (1997) (discussing public attitudes toward unauthorized 
immigrants); Kevin R. Johnson, The End of “Civil Rights” as We Know It?:  Immigration 
and Civil Rights in the New Millennium, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1481, 1485 (2002) (same). 
 3. See Linda Bosniak, Varieties of Citizenship, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2449, 2451 
(2007) (challenging the “apparently self-evident notion that ‘citizenship is for 
citizens’”); Maria L. Ontiveros, Three Perspectives on Workplace Harassment of Women of 
Color, 23 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 817, 822 (1993) (stating that unauthorized 
immigrants are often unaware of their legal rights). 
 4. I use the term “unauthorized immigrants” to refer to foreign nationals who 
live in the United States without work authorization.  The term is designed to avoid 
the political charge and semantic difficulties presented by labels such as “illegal 
alien” and “undocumented immigrant.”  See Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Fear of 
Discovery:  Immigrant Workers and the Fifth Amendment, 41 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 27, 29 n.7 
(2008) (explaining the term). 
 5. See 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b)(1) (2006) (excluding any person who “is not a citizen 
of the United States” from jury service). 
 6. See Michael Scaperlanda, Who Is My Neighbor?:  An Essay on Immigrants, Welfare 
Reform, and the Constitution, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1587, 1588–92 (1997) (discussing 
restrictions on public benefits). 
 7. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 213–31 (1982) (holding that a Texas statute 
denying public education to unauthorized immigrant children violates the Equal 
Protection Clause); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976) (“Even one whose 
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Regardless of status, there is a floor on the level of protections 
enjoyed by all persons territorially present in the United States.   
The extension of legal rights to “lawbreakers,” however, raises several 
questions.  Why would a host country grant legal protections to 
people who flout the country’s rules of admission?  Is the currency of 
“citizenship” in all its forms enhanced or diminished by extending 
rights to the unauthorized?  What are the implications of a nation-
state’s decision to rescind those rights? 
Political and legal theorists have grappled with these questions as 
they relate to contemporary issues of membership.8  They have 
considered how immigration law serves the need for a bounded 
political community and whether extending rights to immigrants 
dilutes the notion of citizenship.9  Yet the issues most often raised in 
these discussions involve border enforcement, admission, and 
exclusion—traditional topics of immigration law.  This Article seeks 
to expand the dialogue by explaining how workplace rights can 
define membership in a community. 
Until recently, unauthorized immigrants could claim virtually every 
right and remedy available under federal workplace protections.   
In most instances they could join unions, sue for sexual harassment, 
and assert other employment rights in the same manner as citizens.10  
The United States Supreme Court disrupted this parity, however, 
when it barred unauthorized immigrants from receiving monetary 
compensation when they are fired illegally for supporting a union.11  
For the first time, the Court announced that not all victims of union-
related discrimination should be treated the same.12  Employers have 
attempted to expand this remedial limitation from the unionized 
setting (i.e., “traditional labor law”) to other workplace protections, 
                                                          
presence in this country is unlawful, involuntary, or transitory is entitled to [Fifth 
Amendment] protection.”); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896) 
(affirming the applicability of due process and speedy trial rights guaranteed by the 
Fifth and Sixth Amendments to unauthorized Chinese immigrants). 
 8. See, e.g., Linda Bosniak, Citizenship Denationalized, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 
447, 448–50 (2000) (discussing the debate over the meaning of “citizenship” among 
political and social theorists). 
 9. See generally Jennifer Gordon & R.A. Lenhardt, Citizenship Talk:  Bridging the 
Gap Between Immigration and Race Perspectives, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2493, 2502 (2007) 
(summarizing discourse on membership). 
 10. See Michael Wishnie, Emerging Issues for Undocumented Workers, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. 
& EMP. L. 497, 501–02 (2004) (discussing coverage of unauthorized immigrants 
under employment statutes).  But see infra Part I and accompanying text (discussing 
the few instances in which an employee’s immigration status limited employment 
protections). 
 11. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 151 (2002). 
 12. See id. (holding that unauthorized immigrants are not entitled to recover 
backpay). 
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such as wage and antidiscrimination laws, with limited success.   
For example, women in New Jersey who are unauthorized immigrants 
can no longer recover backpay for pregnancy discrimination.13   
The same is true for sexual harassment claims in Texas,14 workplace 
injury claims in Michigan,15 and wage retaliation claims in Illinois.16 
Scholars have criticized these losses but have yet to formulate a 
coherent framework for evaluating the rights of unauthorized 
immigrants.  This Article does so by distilling and applying several 
core principles at issue when employment laws conflict with 
immigration laws. 
In Part I, I survey the current state of employment protections for 
unauthorized immigrants.  Beginning with case law that originally 
ignored the role immigration status played in employment claims,  
I show how the rights of unauthorized workers remained intact until 
fairly recently. 
In Part II, I describe three possible endpoints to the decline in 
rights.  These options include:  an “equalized rights” scenario, in 
which unauthorized immigrants enjoy all employment rights and 
remedies; a “diminished rights” scenario, in which unauthorized 
immigrants lack the ability to bring workplace claims; and an 
“ambiguous rights” scenario, in which unauthorized immigrants 
enjoy certain workplace protections but not others, thereby causing 
them to assert fewer claims because of the cluttered state of the law.  
In order to determine the likelihood of each outcome, I identify 
several functional concerns at issue when unauthorized immigrants 
assert workplace claims.  For example, the Supreme Court has 
considered the remedial purpose of federal employment laws and the 
institutional competence of agencies enforcing those protections 
when deciding whether to limit unauthorized immigrants’ 
recoveries.17  I apply these criteria to wage and antidiscrimination 
protections and contend that differences in statutory purpose 
between traditional labor law and other workplace protections 
counsel in favor of equalized employment rights. 
                                                          
 13. See Crespo v. Evergro Corp., 841 A.2d 471, 472–73 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2004) (upholding an employer’s discharge of an unauthorized immigrant returning 
from maternity leave). 
 14. See Escobar v. Spartan Sec. Serv., 281 F. Supp. 2d 895, 896–98 (S.D. Tex. 
2003) (dismissing a plaintiff’s claims for backpay under Title VII). 
 15. See Sanchez v. Eagle Alloy Inc., 658 N.W.2d 510, 512 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003) 
(denying wage-loss benefits). 
 16. See Renteria v. Italia Foods, Inc., No. 02C495, 2003 WL 21995190, at *6 (N.D. 
Ill. Aug. 21, 2003) (striking an unauthorized worker’s claims for backpay). 
 17. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 144-49 (2002). 
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In Part III, I explain that in addition to the functional concerns 
discussed in Part II, unauthorized immigrants’ rights depend on the 
immigration-related incentives created by extending protections to 
all workers.  Because limiting the employment protections available 
to unauthorized workers will not fundamentally alter the incentives 
driving illegal immigration, I argue that national immigration goals 
cannot be achieved through diminished employment rights.  
Nonetheless, equalized rights are far from inevitable.  In fact, the 
inherently malleable nature of any analysis involving immigration-
related incentives could lead to a significant loss of protections for 
unauthorized workers.  For example, the Supreme Court has stated 
that awarding backpay to unauthorized immigrants rewards their 
illegal behavior.18  These same incentives arguably apply to federal 
minimum wage protections.  An immigrant who enters the country 
illegally, tenders false documents to obtain employment, and then 
sues for nonpayment of wages could also be characterized as 
receiving a “reward.”  Although there are key distinctions between 
“backpay” under different workplace protections, it is not entirely 
clear whether these distinctions respond to the Supreme Court’s 
focus on immigration-related incentives.  If they do not, then the 
diminished rights scenario becomes more likely.  
Although the future rights of unauthorized workers will turn partly 
on the foregoing analysis of statutory purpose and immigration 
policy, equally important are the consequences of diminished rights.  
I conclude the Article by explaining why restricting workplace 
protections based on status harms citizens as well as immigrants.   
I argue that employment protections are “rights of partial inclusion” 
that reflect a distinctive sphere—the workplace—where unauthorized 
immigrants should be placed on par with citizens in pursuing 
collective interests. 
The theory of partial inclusion responds to communitarian 
rationales embedded in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on 
unauthorized workers.  From a communitarian standpoint, firm 
borders preserve community identity and protect scarce resources.19  
According to a communitarian approach to employment protections, 
enlarging the circle of workplace rights to include unauthorized 
immigrants harms the community’s project of self-definition.20  
                                                          
 18. Id. at 145. 
 19. MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE:  A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 
31 (1983); see also Gordon & Lenhardt, supra note 9, at 2501 (discussing 
communitarian views). 
 20. See WALZER, supra note 19, at 31–32 (discussing community membership). 
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Consistent with this view, the Supreme Court has attempted to limit 
labor protections based on an employee’s immigration status in order 
to bolster immigration law’s system of determining “who belongs” at 
work and, consequently, in the community.21  Here I argue that such 
restrictions undermine the core normative object of the 
communitarians:  the need for members to invest in their community 
with a shared common purpose.  Antidiscrimination statutes depend 
on universal enforcement.  Wage rates are more likely to drop for 
members of the community, including citizens, if employers are 
attracted to job applicants who cannot recover the minimum wage.  
Workplace rights are not scarce resources, and the ends that 
employment laws seek to achieve—safer conditions, 
nondiscrimination, and minimum wages—are goals shared by every 
worker, regardless of status.  All members of the community—status 
citizens and unauthorized immigrants alike—benefit when the entire 
workforce can assert these rights.  Employment protections thus turn 
communitarian rationales on their head by arguing in favor of 
extending rights to nonmembers. 
The workplace rights of unauthorized immigrants remain in flux.  
Advocates and scholars sympathetic to these workers have reassured 
one another that restrictions in labor law will not expand to other 
workplace laws such as wage and antidiscrimination protections.  
Although this prediction may be true, a compelling case has yet to be 
made based on a detailed analysis of statutory purpose, immigration 
policy, and citizenship theory.  This Article builds a framework for 
equalized rights by engaging these topics. 
I. ERODING RIGHTS 
Immigration law did not collide with employment law until 
recently.  Throughout most of the nation’s history, immigration law 
said nothing about the terms and conditions of an immigrant’s 
employment.22  Even the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)23—
                                                          
21.    Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 149–50. 
 22. See generally THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND 
CITIZENSHIP:  PROCESS AND POLICY 146–62 (5th ed. 2003) (discussing the historical 
development of immigration law); Christopher Ho & Jennifer C. Chang, Drawing the 
Line After Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB:  Strategies for Protecting 
Undocumented Workers in the Title VII Context and Beyond, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 
473, 478–79 (2005) (same). 
 23. Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.  
§§ 1101–1537 (2006)); see also Katherine E. Seitz, Comment, Enter at Your Own Risk:  
The Impact of Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. National Labor Relations Board on the 
Undocumented Worker, 82 N.C. L. REV. 366, 372–73 (2003) (arguing that immigration 
laws and labor statutes are generally silent as to their effect on one another). 
 2009] REDEFINING THE RIGHTS OF UNDOCUMENTED WORKERS 1367 
the country’s central immigration law—did not address unauthorized 
employment when Congress enacted it in 1952.24  Although the INA 
made it illegal for a person to enter the country without permission, 
an immigrant did not violate any other laws by obtaining employment 
once inside the United States.25 
The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA)26 
attempted to close this loophole by adding employment-related 
restrictions to the INA.  In addition to granting legal status to two 
million unauthorized immigrants residing in the country at the 
time,27 the IRCA imposed immigration verification requirements on 
employers.28  As a result, employers are now required to inspect 
certain documents provided by new hires and to attest to the 
documents’ apparent authenticity.29 
Because immigration law said nothing about “illegal” employment 
until the IRCA, courts generally did not question the right of 
unauthorized immigrants to sue employers prior to 1986.  For 
example, courts consistently held that unauthorized immigrants 
enjoyed the minimum wage protections of the Fair Labor Standards 
Act (FLSA),30 the labor protections of the National Labor Relations 
Act (NLRA),31 and the antidiscrimination protections of Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII).32  These pre-IRCA decisions 
                                                          
 24. See William J. Murphy, Note, Immigration Reform Without Control:  The Need for 
an Integrated Immigration-Labor Policy, 17 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 165, 165–66 
(1994) (discussing previous versions of the INA). 
 25. See Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law:  Asymmetric 
Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469, 499 (2007) 
(discussing immigration-related violations); Seitz, supra note 23, at 372–73 
(emphasizing that previous versions of the INA did not make the employment of 
unauthorized immigrants illegal). 
 26. Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 8 U.S.C.). 
 27. See Kris W. Kobach, Remark, Administrative Law:  Immigration, Amnesty, and the 
Rule of Law, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1323, 1330 (2008) (discussing the effects of the 
IRCA). 
 28. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (2006); see Kati L. Griffith, Comment, A Supreme Stretch:   
The Supremacy Clause in the Wake of IRCA and Hoffman Plastic Compounds, 41 
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 127, 128–29 (2008) (discussing the IRCA’s work verification 
system). 
 29. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b) (2006). 
 30. See, e.g., In re Reyes, 814 F.2d 168, 170 (5th Cir. 1987) (applying pre-IRCA law 
and noting the broad definition of “employee” under the FLSA); Donovan v. Burgett 
Greenhouses, Inc., 759 F.2d 1483, 1485 (10th Cir. 1985) (affirming the right of 
unauthorized immigrants to recover unpaid wages under the FLSA). 
 31. See, e.g., NLRB v. Apollo Tire Co., 604 F.2d 1180, 1181 (9th Cir. 1979) 
(holding that unauthorized immigrants are “employees” as defined in section 2(3) of 
the NLRA). 
 32. See, e.g., EEOC v. Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d 1504, 1517 (9th Cir. 1989)  
(sex discrimination); Rios v. Enter. Ass’n Steamfitters Local Union 638, 860 F.2d 
1168, 1172 (2d Cir. 1988) (race and national origin discrimination). 
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affirmed the workplace rights of unauthorized immigrants based on:  
(1) the broad definitions of “employee” contained in the relevant 
employment laws; and (2) the INA’s silence as to unauthorized 
employment.33 
The most important development in pre-IRCA case law occurred in 
1984 when the Supreme Court decided Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB.34  The 
case involved a union-organizing campaign at a small leather 
processing plant.35  The company president, who knew prior to the 
election that five of the eleven workers were unauthorized 
immigrants, reported the employees to the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS) after the workers voted to unionize.36  
The INS arrested the employees and returned them to Mexico.37  In 
response to charges filed against the employer, the National Labor 
Relations Board (NLRB) found that Sure-Tan had committed unfair 
labor practices by calling the INS in retaliation for the workers’ 
protected activity.38  The NLRB awarded the employees the 
“conventional remedy of reinstatement with backpay.”39 
On review, the Supreme Court first addressed the issue of statutory 
coverage.  Noting that the NLRA states, “The term ‘employee’ shall 
include any employee,”40 and contains specific exceptions, none of 
which involve immigration status, the Court held that the NLRA 
covers unauthorized immigrants.41  Turning to the issue of remedies, 
the Court found that the Sure-Tan employees were not legally 
available for work because they would have to cross the border 
illegally in order to obtain new employment.42  Accordingly, the 
employees who lost their jobs because of Sure-Tan’s “blatantly illegal 
course of conduct” could not receive backpay or reinstatement until 
immigration authorities readmitted them to the country.43 
Although Sure-Tan was the Court’s first attempt to delineate the 
employment rights of unauthorized immigrants, the decision did not 
significantly impact the field for two reasons.  First, the Court failed 
                                                          
 33. See In re Reyes, 814 F.2d at 170 (discussing the FLSA’s definition of 
“employee”); NLRB v. Apollo Tire Co., 604 F.2d at 1184 (noting the INA’s silence as 
to employment matters). 
 34. 467 U.S. 883 (1984). 
 35. Id. at 886. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 887. 
 38. Sure-Tan, Inc., 234 N.L.R.B. 1187, 1187 (1978). 
 39. Id. 
 40. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2006). 
 41. See Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 891 (“The breadth of § 2(3)’s definition is striking:  
the Act squarely applies to ‘any employee.’”). 
 42. Id. at 903. 
 43. Id. at 894. 
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to clarify whether the backpay limitation applied to unauthorized 
immigrants residing in the United States, as opposed to the five Sure-
Tan employees in Mexico.44  Second, the decision relied explicitly on 
the INA’s “peripheral concern with employment of illegal entrants.”45 
With the enactment of the IRCA two years later, however, the 
relationship of immigration law to employment law was no longer 
peripheral.  The new verification requirements injected the nation’s 
immigration laws directly into the workplace. 
Somewhat surprisingly, unauthorized workers’ rights remained 
relatively unchanged for the first two decades following Sure-Tan and 
the IRCA.  With few exceptions, courts continued to hold that 
unauthorized immigrants could recover backpay and other remedies 
for workplace violations.46  The field changed significantly in 2002, 
however, with the Supreme Court’s decision in Hoffman Plastic 
Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB.47  Like Sure-Tan, Hoffman involved an 
employer who retaliated against unauthorized immigrants who 
engaged in activities protected by the NLRA; Hoffman committed an 
unfair labor practice by firing Jose Castro for supporting a union.48  
During a subsequent compliance hearing to calculate his damages, 
Mr. Castro admitted that he had tendered fraudulent immigration-
related documents to Hoffman at the time he was hired.49  The NLRB 
awarded Mr. Castro over $60,000 in backpay, despite the fact that  
Mr. Castro had misled his employer about his immigration status.50 
On review, the Supreme Court considered whether the NLRB 
correctly awarded Mr. Castro backpay for the work he lost because of 
the illegal discharge.51  Writing for the 5-4 majority, Justice Rehnquist 
described “a legal landscape now significantly changed” by the 
                                                          
 44. See Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 146–47 (2002) 
(describing a split of authority as to whether Sure-Tan “applies only to aliens who left 
the United States and thus cannot claim backpay without lawful reentry”). 
 45. Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 892 (quoting De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 359 
(1976)). 
 46. See, e.g., NLRB v. Kolkka, 170 F.3d 937, 940 (9th Cir. 1999) (extending 
coverage under the NLRA to unauthorized workers); NLRB v. A.P.R.A. Fuel Oil 
Buyers Group, Inc., 134 F.3d 50, 58 (2d Cir. 1997) (NLRA); Rios v. Enter. Ass’n 
Steamfitters Local Union 638, 860 F.2d 1168, 1173 (2d Cir. 1988) (Title VII); Patel v. 
Quality Inn S., 846 F.2d 700, 704 (11th Cir. 1988) (FLSA); In re Reyes, 814 F.2d 168, 
170 (5th Cir. 1987) (FLSA).  But see, e.g., Egbuna v. Time-Life Libraries, Inc., 153 
F.3d 184, 186–87 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding that unauthorized immigrants are not 
“qualified” for employment under Title VII); Del Rey Tortilleria, Inc. v. NLRB, 976 
F.2d 1115, 1120–22 (7th Cir. 1992) (extending the NLRA’s coverage to unauthorized 
immigrants but denying backpay). 
 47. 535 U.S. 137 (2002). 
 48. Id. at 140. 
 49. Id. at 141. 
 50. Id. at 141–42. 
 51. Id. 
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IRCA.52  The Court reversed the NLRB as to the backpay award, 
holding that to do otherwise would reward Mr. Castro’s illegal 
behavior and conflict with the IRCA’s border-enforcement 
objectives.53 
Soon after Hoffman, employers began to argue that unauthorized 
immigrants could no longer sue under Title VII, the FLSA, or any 
other workplace protection.54  To date, nearly every court to rule on 
the issue has refused to extend the backpay limitation in NLRA cases 
to minimum wage and overtime protections.55 
Discrimination cases have yielded more mixed results, though 
unauthorized immigrants may still recover full Title VII remedies in 
most jurisdictions.56  Actions outside the courts suggest that Title VII 
remains somewhat vulnerable to remedial losses.  Following Hoffman, 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which 
enforces Title VII, rescinded its previous support for extending 
backpay to all workers regardless of status.57  In addition, some Title 
VII plaintiffs now withdraw their backpay claims rather than allow 
courts to rule on whether the remedy remains available to them.58 
Scholars have expressed widely divergent views on whether the 
current backpay restrictions in labor law will extend to other 
employment protections.  One camp argues that Hoffman represents 
a human rights crisis that will cause a great shift in the workplace 
                                                          
 52. Id. at 147. 
 53. Id. at 145 (citing Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 903 (1984)). 
 54. See Mariel Martinez, Comment, The Hoffman Aftermath:  Analyzing the Plight of 
the Undocumented Worker Through a “Wider Lens”, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 661, 663–64 
(2005) (discussing employer reactions to Hoffman). 
55.   See, e.g., Chellen v. John Pickle Co., 446 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1276–77 (N.D. 
Okla. 2006) (discussing the definition of “employee” under the FLSA); Zavala v.  
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 2d 295, 323 (D.N.J. 2005) (concluding that 
unauthorized immigrants are “employees” under the FLSA); Galaviz-Zamora v. Brady 
Farms, Inc., 230 F.R.D. 499, 501–03 (W.D. Mich. 2005) (explaining that the FLSA 
effectively protects unauthorized workers from exploitation and retaliation); Flores v. 
Amigon, 233 F. Supp. 2d 462, 463 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (agreeing with other courts that 
have applied the FLSA to employees regardless of their immigration status). 
 56. Compare Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1067 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(distinguishing Title VII from Hoffman), with Escobar v. Spartan Sec. Serv., 281 F. 
Supp. 2d 895, 896–98 (S.D. Tex. 2003) (denying backpay under Title VII). 
 57. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, DIRECTIVES TRANSMITTAL NO. 
915.002, RESCISSION OF ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO 
UNDOCUMENTED WORKERS UNDER FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS (2002), 
available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/undoc-rescind.html. 
 58. See Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., No. CIV-F-99-6443, 2006 WL 845925, at *1 (E.D. 
Cal. Mar. 31, 2006) (Title VII plaintiffs who are unable to prove entitlement to work 
agree to withdraw backpay claims); Lopez v. Superflex, Ltd., No. 01 CIV. 10010, 2002 
WL 1941484, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2002) (plaintiff alleging disability 
discrimination withdraws backpay claim “in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Hoffman”). 
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rights of unauthorized immigrants.59  These critics contend that 
immigrants face an increasingly hostile judiciary that will eventually 
eliminate certain workplace rights available to unauthorized 
immigrants.60  Others assert that Hoffman is limited to the NLRA and 
will not affect other employment statutes.61 
Given the inconsistency among the responses to Hoffman, it is safe 
to say that immigrants’ rights will remain undefined for the indefinite 
future.62  This disarray underscores the need for a coherent 
framework for evaluating the future rights of unauthorized workers. 
II. THE FUNCTION OF EMPLOYMENT PROTECTIONS 
Three possible outcomes could emerge from the current 
amorphous state of unauthorized workers’ rights.  Here I explain 
those outcomes and consider the likelihood of each based on the 
structure and purpose of wage and antidiscrimination statutes, as 
compared to labor law. 
I call the first scenario an “equalized rights” outcome.  Congress 
might pass legislation that blunts the force of Hoffman or the 
Supreme Court may reverse itself.  Lower courts could refuse to 
extend current backpay limitations to Title VII and the FLSA.  In the 
equalized rights outcome, all employees could recover nearly every 
workplace remedy regardless of status.63  Unauthorized immigrants 
                                                          
 59. See, e.g., LANCE COMPA, UNFAIR ADVANTAGE:  WORKERS’ FREEDOM OF 
ASSOCIATION IN THE UNITED STATES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS 
xxi (2004) (suggesting that workplace protections may be forfeited); Robert I. 
Correales, Did Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc., Produce Disposable Workers?,  
14 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 103, 146 (2003) (speculating that statutory protections for 
unauthorized immigrants may be in danger in some jurisdictions following Hoffman). 
 60. See, e.g., Seitz, supra note 23, at 406–07 (expressing concerns that Hoffman 
may be used to deny minimum wage and workers’ compensation protections);  
see also Wishnie, supra note 10, at 508 (suggesting that unauthorized immigrants may 
lose the ability to recover backpay under Title VII). 
 61. See, e.g., Christopher David Ruiz Cameron, Borderline Decisions:  Hoffman 
Plastic Compounds, The New Bracero Program, and the Supreme Court’s Role in Making 
Federal Labor Policy, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1, 5 n.19 (2003) (predicting limited impact); 
Christine Dana Smith, Comment, Give Us Your Tired, Your Poor:  Hoffman and the 
Future of Immigrants’ Workplace Rights, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 363, 364 (2003) (arguing that 
Hoffman does not extend to Title VII or the FLSA). 
 62. See María Pabón López, The Place of the Undocumented Worker in the United States 
Legal System After Hoffman Plastic Compounds:  An Assessment and Comparison with 
Argentina’s Legal System, 15 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 301, 321 (2005) (arguing that 
“the future is yet to come” for unauthorized immigrants asserting Title VII claims); 
Seitz, supra note 23, at 370 (“[T]he rights of undocumented workers are perilously 
undefined.”). 
 63. Unauthorized immigrants would remain ineligible for reinstatement, 
however, given that courts could not order employers to rehire unauthorized 
immigrants in violation of the IRCA.  See infra Part II.C.2 (discussing the remedies 
available to unauthorized immigrants). 
 1372 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:1361 
would still largely fail to assert these rights out of fear of retaliation or 
deportation, but the rights themselves would be available. 
The second outcome, what I call an “ambiguous rights” scenario, 
reflects the current, muddled state of affairs.  Because employers 
have experienced limited success in their attempts to extend 
remedial limitations in labor law to other employment laws such as 
antidiscrimination protections, unauthorized immigrants do not 
know which claims remain viable.  Given that unauthorized 
immigrants are already reluctant to complain for fear of retaliation, 
the ambiguity surrounding their employment rights further decreases 
the likelihood that they will attempt to rectify workplace wrongs. 
Under the third scenario, a “diminished rights” outcome, clarity is 
restored to the field.  Legislative action or judicial consistency will 
state definitively that unauthorized immigrants can no longer recover 
certain remedies for employment violations.  This could mean 
limiting backpay awards or banning unauthorized immigrants from 
asserting workplace claims altogether. 
All three outcomes remain possible because courts have failed to 
establish clear criteria for resolving conflicts between employment 
laws and immigration laws.  Here I develop those criteria based on 
the functional concerns expressed by the Supreme Court in its recent 
jurisprudence on unauthorized workers.  By “functional concerns”  
I mean the structure and purpose of employment statutes as they 
relate to immigration restrictions.  The Court has twice considered 
the function of the NLRA as it relates to the INA.  In these cases, the 
Court restricted the remedies available to unauthorized immigrants, 
finding that the NLRB is not competent to evaluate immigration 
policy and that a backpay limitation would not undermine the basic 
purpose of the NLRA.64 
By applying the same functional criteria—administrative 
competence and remedial purpose—to Title VII and the FLSA, I will 
explain why wage and antidiscrimination protections cannot be 
restricted in the same way that the Supreme Court has limited the 
NLRA.  Title VII and the FLSA are certainly not the only employment 
statutes at issue, but they are arguably the most critical given that they 
secure such fundamental workplace interests as freedom from 
discrimination and payment of wages.  In addition, employers have 
expended a great deal of effort on limiting backpay under Title VII 
                                                          
 64. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 152 (2002); Sure-
Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 883 (1984). 
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and the FLSA, making these statutes crucial fault lines in the debate 
over the rights of unauthorized workers.65 
A. Moving Beyond Statutory Text 
The most logical starting point for determining whether 
immigration laws should limit Title VII and the FLSA would be the 
text of the relevant statutes—in this case, the IRCA and the 
employment statutes that the IRCA supposedly limits.66  Oddly, the 
Supreme Court’s recent decisions on unauthorized workers largely 
sidestep issues of statutory interpretation in favor of a broader policy 
analysis.  The basis of the Court’s authority to focus on policy while 
ignoring statutory text and history is not entirely clear.  After all, 
there is no canon of statutory construction that allows courts to “pick 
and choose”67 their favorite congressional enactments based on vague 
notions of “policy.”68  The Hoffman Court stated that the IRCA is 
“understandably silent” as to its effect on the NLRA.69  This silence 
notwithstanding, the Court inferred an intent to displace labor law 
remedies based on Congress’s decision to criminalize immigration-
related document fraud.70 
Although congressional silence led to diminished rights in the 
context of the NLRA, Title VII and the FLSA played a much more 
prominent role than the NLRA in congressional deliberations on the 
IRCA.  Unfortunately, most scholarly critiques of Hoffman have 
glossed over this point.  When the argument over congressional 
intent is raised, the discussion is usually limited to two congressional 
committee reports.  The House Judiciary Committee reviewing the 
IRCA stated: 
It is not the intention of the Committee that the employer 
sanctions provisions of the bill be used to undermine or diminish 
in any way labor protections in existing law, or to limit the powers 
                                                          
 65. See, e.g., Martinez, supra note 54, at 673 (discussing attempts to limit 
antidiscrimination statutes); Mohar Ray, Note, Undocumented Asian American Workers 
and State Wage Laws in the Aftermath of Hoffman Plastic Compounds, 13 ASIAN AM. L.J. 
91, 97 (2006) (noting Hoffman’s impact on wage claims). 
 66. See Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 300–01 (1989) (“Interpretation 
of a statute must begin with the statute’s language.”). 
 67. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974) (“[C]ourts are not at liberty 
to pick and choose among congressional enactments.”). 
 68. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 154 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Where in the immigration 
laws can the Court find a ‘policy’ that might warrant taking from the Board this 
critically important remedial power?  Certainly not in any statutory language.”).   
See generally William W. Buzbee, The One-Congress Fiction in Statutory Interpretation, 149 
U. PA. L. REV. 171, 231–36 (2000) (discussing different methods of statutory analysis). 
 69. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 149 (majority opinion). 
 70. Id. 
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of federal or state labor relations boards . . . to remedy unfair 
practices committed against undocumented employees.71 
The House Education and Labor Committee stated that the IRCA 
did not prevent federal agencies, including the NLRB, the EEOC, 
and the Department of Labor (DOL), from “remedy[ing] unfair 
practices committed against undocumented employees.”72 
These reports appear to support equalized rights in wage and 
discrimination cases.  They reaffirm the authority of the EEOC and 
DOL, which enforce Title VII and the FLSA respectively, to obtain 
full remedies for unauthorized immigrants.  Yet the Hoffman Court 
expressly rejected this legislative history, describing the Judiciary 
Committee report as “a rather slender reed” on which to rely.73  Given 
the Court’s rather dismissive treatment of the legislative history, it 
seems unlikely that the committee reports alone will immunize Title 
VII and the FLSA from remedial restrictions. 
This is not to say that courts considering whether to limit remedies 
in Title VII and FLSA cases should ignore the IRCA’s legislative 
history.  Rather, the analysis should extend beyond committee 
reports to other evidence related to the IRCA’s effect, if any, on 
substantive employment protections.  In the case of the FLSA, 
congressional action points toward equalized rights.  For example, at 
the same time it enacted the IRCA, Congress appropriated additional 
funds to the DOL’s Wage and Hour Division “in order to deter the 
employment of unauthorized aliens and remove the economic 
incentive for employers to exploit and use such aliens.”74  This step 
was consistent with efforts by the Nixon, Ford, Carter, and Reagan 
Administrations to fund targeted wage enforcement actions on behalf 
of unauthorized workers.75  It is no coincidence that the same 
legislation barred unauthorized workers from obtaining employment 
and appropriated additional funds to allow them to recover overtime 
                                                          
 71. H.R. REP. NO. 99-682, pt. 1, at 58 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 
5662. 
 72. H.R. REP. NO. 99-682, pt. 2, at 8–9 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5757, 
5758. 
 73. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 149 n.4; see Agri Processor Co. v. NLRB, 514 F.3d 1,  
13–14 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“[O]ne of the reports cited by 
the majority opinion is the exact same report that the Hoffman Court dismissed as a 
‘rather slender reed.’” (citation omitted)). 
 74. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), Pub. L. No. 99-603,  
§ 111(d), 100 Stat. 3359, 3381 (codified as amended in scattered sections of  
8 U.S.C.). 
 75. See Richard E. Blum, Note, Labor Standards Enforcement and the Realities of Labor 
Migration:  Protecting Undocumented Workers after Sure-Tan, the IRCA, and Patel,  
63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1342, 1360–68 (1988) (discussing the history of immigration and 
labor enforcement). 
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and the minimum wage.  Both acts serve the same goal:  to raise the 
price of hiring this group of workers.  Employers pay the price either 
through IRCA penalties or wage enforcement actions brought on 
behalf of unauthorized immigrants.76 
Congress also considered Title VII, albeit indirectly, when enacting 
the IRCA.  Legislators were concerned that the IRCA’s work 
verification requirements would cause employers to discriminate 
against “foreign-looking” and “foreign-sounding” job applicants.77  
Accordingly, Congress included protections in the IRCA to prevent 
discrimination based on national origin and citizenship status.78  For 
example, employers cannot refuse to hire job applicants because they 
are foreign-born.79  Critically, Congress expressly excluded 
“unauthorized aliens” from the IRCA’s antidiscrimination 
protections.80  Thus, unauthorized immigrants cannot file an IRCA 
complaint if a company commits national origin discrimination 
against them.  Unlike the IRCA, Title VII contains no such express 
exclusion. 
Statutes should be read in a manner that gives each term 
meaning.81  The only interpretation that gives meaning to the IRCA’s 
exclusion of “unauthorized aliens” is that without the exclusion, the 
IRCA’s antidiscrimination provision would cover this group of 
workers.  Because Title VII contains no such exclusion, the argument 
goes, it should be read as covering all employees regardless of status. 
                                                          
 76. See Noriega-Perez v. United States, 179 F.3d 1166, 1170–71 (9th Cir. 1999) 
(discussing the purpose of the IRCA’s enforcement scheme); Patel v. Quality Inn S., 
846 F.2d 700, 704 (11th Cir. 1988) (maintaining that Congress intended for the 
FLSA to protect undocumented workers, as demonstrated by its appropriation of 
additional funds for this group of workers in order to enforce the FLSA); Susan 
Charnesky, Comment, Protection for Undocumented Workers Under the FLSA:   
An Evaluation in Light of IRCA, 25 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 379, 397–98 (1988) (same);  
see also Ho & Chang, supra note 22, at 483–84 (noting that the IRCA provided 
funding for the heightened enforcement of labor standards so as to discourage 
employers from hiring unauthorized immigrants). 
 77. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, GAO/GGD-90-62, 
IMMIGRATION REFORM:  EMPLOYER SANCTIONS AND THE QUESTION OF DISCRIMINATION 
41–42 (1990), available at http://archive.gao.gov/d24t8/140974.pdf; see also Cynthia 
Bansak & Steven Raphael, Immigration Reform and the Earnings of Latino Workers:   
Do Employer Sanctions Cause Discrimination?, 54 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 275, 277 (2001) 
(discussing discrimination under the IRCA); Sarah Cleveland et al., Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights Amicus Curiae Brief:  The United States Violates International Law 
When Labor Law Remedies Are Restricted Based on Workers’ Migrant Status, 1 SEATTLE J. 
SOC. JUST. 795, 802 (2003) (discussing employer retaliation). 
 78. 8 U.S.C. § 1324b (2006). 
 79. Id. § 1324b(a)(1). 
 80. Id. 
 81. See Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., 486 U.S. 825, 837 (1988) (“As 
our cases have noted in the past, we are hesitant to adopt an interpretation of a 
congressional enactment which renders superfluous another portion of that same 
law.”). 
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Of course, one statute’s express exclusion of unauthorized 
immigrants (the IRCA) does not necessarily preclude another 
statute’s implied exclusion (Title VII).  However, given that the two 
statutes prohibit an identical type of behavior (national origin 
discrimination)82 and force employers who engage in that behavior to 
compensate employees with the same remedy (backpay), the fact that 
Congress felt compelled to expressly exclude unauthorized 
immigrants from the IRCA should at least inform an interpretation of 
Title VII. 
The IRCA’s text states explicitly that it has “no effect on EEOC 
authority.”83  When Congress enacted the IRCA in 1986, most courts 
and the EEOC itself had uniformly interpreted “EEOC authority” to 
include securing backpay for unauthorized immigrants who were the 
victims of discrimination based on national origin and other 
protected categories.84  Congress is presumed to know judicial and 
administrative interpretations of existing law “pertinent to the 
legislation it enacts.”85  Therefore, when it stated that the IRCA’s 
antidiscrimination provision relating to national origin 
discrimination had no effect on the EEOC’s authority to combat 
national origin discrimination, Congress was aware that lower courts 
and the agency itself had interpreted its authority to include securing 
full remedies for unauthorized workers. 
Congress knows how to limit the workplace protections of 
unauthorized immigrants when it decides to do so.  IRCA’s 
prohibition on national origin discrimination does exactly that, but 
Title VII’s prohibition on national origin discrimination says nothing 
about excluding “unauthorized aliens.”86  The IRCA was amended 
twice in the 1990s, both times excluding “unauthorized aliens” from 
                                                          
 82. Title VII applies to companies with fifteen or more employees, while the 
IRCA’s antidiscrimination provision applies to companies with four to fourteen 
employees.  8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(2)(A), (B) (2006); Juan P. Osuna, Breaking New 
Ground:  The 1996 Immigration Act’s Provisions on Work Verification and Employer 
Sanctions, 11 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 329, 334 (1997). 
 83. 8 U.S.C. § 1324b (2006). 
 84. See supra Part I (discussing the pre-IRCA period during which courts 
universally extended Title VII coverage to unauthorized immigrants).  In 1998, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit became the first and only 
federal appellate court to depart from this precedent.  Egbuna v. Time-Life Libraries, 
Inc., 153 F.3d 184, 186–87 (4th Cir. 1998). 
 85. Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 486 U.S. 174, 184–85 (1988); see also 
Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580–81 (1978) (“Congress is presumed to be aware of 
an administrative or judicial interpretation of a statute and to adopt that 
interpretation when it re-enacts a statute without any change.”). 
 86. See generally Ho & Chang, supra note 22, at 506–08 (discussing the IRCA’s 
antidiscrimination provisions); Maria L. Ontiveros, To Help Those Most in Need:  
Undocumented Workers’ Rights and Remedies Under Title VII, 20 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. 
CHANGE 607, 615–16 (1993) (discussing congressional intent in enacting the IRCA). 
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its antidiscrimination protections.87  Likewise, Congress amended 
Title VII in 199188 without mentioning unauthorized immigrants, 
even though courts were awarding backpay to this group of workers.89  
Each time Congress amended the legislation without limiting Title 
VII’s coverage or remedies, it accepted the judicial consensus on the 
issue.90 
The IRCA’s legislative text and history favor equalized rights for 
claims brought by unauthorized immigrants in Title VII and FLSA 
cases.  Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has shown a decided lack of 
interest in considering Congress’s intent in enacting the IRCA.91   
If lower courts similarly downplay the importance of legislative intent, 
the future rights of unauthorized workers will likely turn on other 
factors enunciated by the Supreme Court such as the purpose of 
wage and antidiscrimination laws and the border-related incentives 
they create. 
B. Administrative Competence 
The Hoffman Court refused to defer to the NLRB’s inexpert 
determinations on immigration matters.  Thus, although the NLRB 
and every federal agency that addressed the issue found that 
immigration law and labor law could coexist,92 the Supreme Court 
disagreed, noting that the NLRB’s order granting monetary remedies 
to unauthorized immigrants “trench[ed] upon a federal statute . . . 
outside the Board’s competence to administer.”93  The Court could 
disturb the backpay award because it exceeded “the bounds of the 
Board’s remedial discretion.”94 
If administrative competence is as important as the Hoffman Court 
suggested—and it strongly suggested that this was the most important 
criterion given its repeated references to the issue95—then the 
decision will not lead to diminished rights in Title VII and FLSA 
cases.  The NLRB is a unique administrative body that investigates, 
                                                          
 87. 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(6); Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 421(a), 110 Stat. 3009 (1996). 
 88. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) (2006). 
 89. See EEOC v. Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d 1504, 1517 (9th Cir. 1989) (discussing 
the effect of Title VII amendments on immigration law). 
 90. Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 580. 
 91. See, e.g., Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 353 U.S. 137, 154 (2002) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for focusing on immigration policy 
rather than statutory language and purpose). 
 92. See id. at 153 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting unanimity among federal 
agencies). 
 93. Id. at 144, 147 (majority opinion). 
 94. Id. at 149. 
 95. Id. at 146–52. 
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prosecutes, and adjudicates unfair labor practice charges.96  Although 
the NLRB is skilled at evaluating labor law violations, it is not 
competent to balance outside federal objectives.97  Unlike charges 
brought before the NLRB, Title VII and FLSA claims are prosecuted 
in court.98  Federal judges possess the very expertise needed to 
balance competing federal interests that the NLRB lacks.99 
Imagine a Title VII plaintiff who is fired for complaining about 
sexual harassment.  Although she was an unauthorized immigrant at 
the time of the discharge, she later received work authorization 
through a T-visa because she was a victim of human trafficking.100   
A federal judge hearing her Title VII case could evaluate the harm 
done to immigration policy by awarding the plaintiff backpay.   
The judge could compare the relative gravity of the employer’s 
conduct, as compared to the immigrant’s now-legalized presence, 
and evaluate the incentives for future illegal behavior created by 
awarding backpay.101  Although the NLRB cannot engage in this kind 
of balancing, the court hearing the Title VII case can. 
Despite the logic of the administrative competence argument, 
however, it avoids a statutory conflict that the Hoffman Court seemed 
determined to confront.  In fact, if unfair labor practice charges were 
filed in federal court rather than with the NLRB, the outcome in 
Hoffman would probably not have changed.  Assume that a federal 
district court, rather than the NLRB, had awarded backpay to 
unauthorized immigrants who were victims of unfair labor practices.  
On review, the Hoffman Court would have faced the same conflict 
between the IRCA and the NLRA.  Even though a lower “expert” 
court would have balanced the competing federal objectives, the 
Supreme Court likely would have shown no more deference to the 
                                                          
 96. See Nhan T. Vu & Jeff Schwartz, Workplace Rights and Illegal Immigration:   
How Implied Repeal Analysis Cuts Through the Haze of Hoffman Plastic, Its Predecessors and 
Its Progeny, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 49–50 (2008) (summarizing the argument 
over administrative competence). 
 97. Southern S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31, 47 (1942). 
 98. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 60 n.21 (1974) (noting 
that Congress charged courts with bringing “ultimate resolution” to discrimination 
claims).  Although employees can file charges with the EEOC and DOL, Title VII 
and the FLSA rely primarily on private enforcement in court.  Charnesky, supra note 
76, at 382–83. 
 99. See, e.g., Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1068 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(discussing judicial competence in Title VII cases). 
 100. See Ivy C. Lee & Mie Lewis, Human Trafficking from a Legal Advocate’s 
Perspective:  History, Legal Framework and Current Anti-Trafficking Efforts, 10 U.C. DAVIS J. 
INT’L L. & POL’Y 169, 179–81 (2003) (describing the criteria human trafficking 
victims must meet in order to receive T-visas). 
 101. See Eric Schnapper, Righting Wrongs Against Immigrant Workers, 39 TRIAL 46, 
47–48 (2003) (noting that judges routinely balance competing interests when 
formulating equitable relief). 
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lower court’s determination than it did to the NLRB’s.102  The Court 
would still have evaluated two federal laws in conflict and formulated 
a remedial outcome that alleviated the conflict.103 
For wage and discrimination cases, the importance of 
administrative competence depends on whether courts wish to touch 
Hoffman’s heart or surface.  On its surface, the decision stands for the 
limited proposition that a federal agency charged with prosecuting 
labor law violations has no business considering immigration matters.  
Because FLSA and Title VII cases do not involve such inexpert agency 
determinations, Hoffman is inapposite.  On the other hand, courts 
may view these cases as presenting a conflict between the federal 
objectives of controlling the border and regulating the workplace.104  
If courts adopt the latter position, then the issue of administrative 
competence falls away, and other functional considerations 
enunciated by the Hoffman Court such as remedial purpose will 
become the critical factors in determining the extent of unauthorized 
workers’ rights. 
C. Remedial Purpose and Statutory Gutting 
According to the Supreme Court, when immigration law conflicts 
with labor law, one federal interest must yield to the other.105  If labor 
law prevails, immigration law is diminished.  If immigration law 
restricts workplace remedies, labor law is diminished.  The issue, 
then, is which outcome does less violence to either important federal 
interest.  According to the Court, awarding backpay to unauthorized 
workers undermines the “cornerstone” of immigration enforcement, 
while stripping the remedy from the NLRA leaves intact the basic 
workings of federal labor policy.106  In essence, the Court found that 
restricting backpay would not eviscerate the NLRA, while granting 
unauthorized immigrants backpay would significantly damage the 
                                                          
 102. See Vu & Schwartz, supra note 96, at 50 (discussing the argument in Hoffman 
that the NLRB lacked competence to consider federal immigration goals). 
 103. See Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 384 F.3d 822, 833 (9th Cir. 2004) (Bea, J., 
dissenting) (rejecting Hoffman’s administrative competence argument).  But see 
Madeira v. Affordable Hous. Found., Inc., 469 F.3d 219, 237 n.19 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(arguing that Hoffman is limited to cases involving inexpert agency determinations). 
 104. See Vu & Schwartz, supra note 96, at 50 (criticizing the administrative 
competence rationale); see also Matthew S. Panach, Two Wrongs Don’t Make A Right . . . 
To Receive Backpay?:  The Post-Hoffman Polarity of Escobar and Rivera, 60 ARK. L. REV. 
907, 935–36 (2008) (characterizing the argument over agency expertise as  
“a distinction without consequence”). 
 105. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 147 (2002). 
 106. See id. at 145, 148 (holding that the NLRA’s “more effective remedies” must 
give way to “the practical workings of the immigration laws” (citing Sure-Tan, Inc. v. 
NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 904 (1984)). 
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INA.  This creates what I call a “gutting standard” for evaluating 
remedial restrictions in other contexts.  Courts can forbid 
unauthorized immigrants from recovering workplace remedies as 
long as the limitation does not severely restrict (i.e., “gut”) the 
employment law’s ability to achieve its core purposes. 
The statutory gutting analysis, which has led to diminished rights in 
labor cases, does not support limiting wage and antidiscrimination 
laws.  Although the Supreme Court determined that restricting labor 
remedies would not undermine the goals of the NLRA, the distinct 
nature of Title VII and the FLSA require a different outcome.  For 
example, a backpay limitation would severely hamper Title VII’s 
ability to eradicate workplace discrimination.  Likewise, restricting 
the FLSA’s remedies would undermine the statute’s goal of 
improving workplace conditions.  In essence, the balance between 
immigration law and labor law struck by the Court in its 
jurisprudence on unauthorized workers cannot be achieved for wage 
and antidiscrimination protections. 
1. The high standard for gutting 
The Supreme Court has noted that employers do not “get[] off 
scot-free” even though they pay nothing when they fire unauthorized 
immigrants in violation of the NLRA.107  The NLRB can still require 
employers to post a workplace notice summarizing the misconduct.108  
In addition, employers are subject to cease and desist orders and 
“significant sanctions” should they violate the orders.109  In essence, 
then, prohibiting unauthorized immigrants from recovering backpay 
for labor law violations does not “gut” labor law itself. 
In order to determine whether the gutting standard announced in 
the NLRA context will lead to diminished rights in wage and 
discrimination cases, consider the breadth of the backpay restriction 
in labor law.  Backpay, the only monetary remedy available to victims 
of discrimination under the NLRA,110 is designed primarily to 
“protect[] and compensat[e] . . .  employees.”111  The Supreme Court 
has emphasized the compensatory function of backpay under the 
                                                          
 107. Id. at 152; see also Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 904 n.13 (noting the existence of 
other remedies that can deter misconduct). 
 108. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 152. 
 109. Id. 
 110. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (2006). 
 111. Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7, 10–11 (1940); see Paul Weiler, 
Promises to Keep:  Securing Workers’ Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. 
L. REV. 1769, 1787–88 (1983) (noting that the NLRA is “heavily oriented toward the 
repair of harm inflicted on individual victims of antiunion action by employers”). 
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NLRA, explicitly rejecting a deterrence rationale.  In the touchstone 
case of Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB,112 the Court stated: 
[I]t is not enough to justify the Board’s requirements to say that 
they would have the effect of deterring persons from violating the 
Act.  That argument proves too much, for if such a deterrent effect 
is sufficient to sustain an order of the Board, it would be free to set 
up any system of penalties which it would deem adequate to that 
end.113 
Despite criticism of Republic Steel’s strict remedial line,114 the Court 
has never strayed from its admonition that backpay awarded under 
the NLRA must primarily compensate, even if it serves an ancillary 
deterrence function. 
In denying backpay to unauthorized immigrants, the Hoffman 
Court undermined the central goal of labor law remedies as defined 
by Republic Steel:  making victims of discrimination whole.115  
According to the Hoffman Court, labor law can bear this restriction 
because unauthorized immigrants lose only those wages they never 
could have earned legally.116  Even if the ban on backpay undermines 
the NLRA’s secondary deterrence objective, cease and desist orders 
can achieve that end.117 
In sum, the standard for statutory gutting turns on the relative 
importance of deterrence and compensation within the remedial 
scheme of each employment statute.  Workplace protections that are 
designed mainly to compensate employees can tolerate a backpay ban 
because the restriction only impairs unauthorized immigrants’ ability 
to recover compensation they never should have earned.  In contrast, 
remedial restrictions that lower the price of misconduct for 
employers would do far greater harm to workplace protections that 
place greater emphasis on preventing illegal behavior. 
2. Gutting antidiscrimination protections 
Upon a finding of intentional discrimination, Title VII authorizes 
courts to award backpay, front pay, compensatory damages, punitive 
                                                          
 112. 311 U.S. 7 (1940). 
 113. Id. at 12. 
 114. See, e.g., Weiler, supra note 111, at 1788–90 (discussing deterrence under the 
NLRA); Michael Weiner, Can the NLRB Deter Unfair Labor Practices?  Reassessing the 
Punitive-Remedial Distinction in Labor Law Enforcement, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1579, 1590–94 
(2005) (same). 
 115. Republic Steel, 311 U.S. at 12. 
 116. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 146–50 (2002). 
 117. See id. at 152 (noting that employers are subject to cease and desist orders 
even without backpay); Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 904 n.13 (1984) 
(same). 
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damages, reinstatement, attorneys’ fees, and injunctive relief.118  
Courts are unlikely to strip any monetary remedy other than 
backpay119 from unauthorized immigrants.  Compensatory damages 
for emotional distress, punitive damages, and attorneys’ fees remain 
available because they do not constitute “wages that could not 
lawfully have been earned.”120  In contrast, reinstatement orders 
would force employers to hire unauthorized immigrants in violation 
of the IRCA, thus precluding the remedy.121 
Those who support diminished rights take what I call an “anti-
gutting” view of backpay restrictions in Title VII cases.  Under this 
approach, Title VII can tolerate diminished rights because the loss of 
backpay leaves Title VII plaintiffs with a near-complete remedial 
arsenal.122  According to the anti-gutting view, if the Hoffman Court 
could eliminate backpay—the only monetary remedy available to the 
NLRB—without gutting the NLRA, then certainly Title VII would 
maintain its vigor following a ban on backpay.123 
The anti-gutting view assumes incorrectly that backpay occupies 
identical roles within the remedial schemes of Title VII and the 
NLRA.  At first glance, the language of the two statutes appears to 
support this reading.  The NLRA authorizes the NLRB “to take such 
affirmative action including reinstatement of employees with or 
without backpay, as will effectuate the policies of this subchapter.”124  
Under Title VII, a court may “order such affirmative action as may be 
appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement 
or hiring of employees, with or without back pay.”125  Congress 
modeled Title VII’s remedial language after the NLRA, and courts 
                                                          
 118. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981a(a)(1), 2000e-5(g)(1), (k) (2006). 
 119. For purposes of evaluating unauthorized workers’ Title VII remedies, I treat 
“front pay” as conceptually identical to backpay given that both remedies involve 
compensation for a worker’s lost employment.  See Pollard v. E.I. du Pont de 
Nemours & Co., 532 U.S. 843, 846–50 (2001) (noting that backpay represents lost 
earnings from the time of discharge to judgment, while front pay represents lost 
earnings from the time of judgment to reinstatement). 
 120. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 149.  At oral argument, Hoffman’s counsel agreed that 
compensatory damages would remain available in Title VII cases because they are 
“not dependent on the victims [sic] authorization to work in this country.”  
Transcript of Oral Argument at *19–20, Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 
535 U.S. 137 (2002) (No. 00-15952002), 2002 WL 77224. 
 121. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(2) (2006); see Griffith, supra note 28, at 130 n.26 (noting 
that court-ordered reinstatement would force employers to violate the IRCA). 
 122. See, e.g., Craig Robert Senn, Proposing a Uniform Remedial Approach for 
Undocumented Workers Under Federal Employment Discrimination Law, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 
113, 173 (2008) (arguing that even without backpay, Title VII remedies are “far more 
substantial” than the limited equitable remedies left by Hoffman). 
 123. Id. 
 124. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (2006). 
 125. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (2006). 
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have relied on the NLRA to define backpay under Title VII.126  Given 
these parallels, it might appear perfectly logical to conclude that the 
loss of backpay under the NLRA should require the same outcome in 
Title VII cases. 
Such an analysis, however, ignores the crucial role backpay plays in 
achieving Title VII’s prophylactic objective, as compared to the 
NLRA.  Although the NLRB cannot formulate backpay awards with 
the specific goal of preventing misconduct,127 the Supreme Court has 
stated that Title VII remedies should primarily deter and that backpay 
serves that end.128  The distinct nature of backpay under Title VII 
raises two critical issues:  (1) whether courts can achieve the statute’s 
deterrence objective without backpay; and, if not, (2) whether the 
loss of the deterrence objective would harm Title VII any more 
fundamentally than Hoffman harmed the NLRA.  Fortunately, the 
Supreme Court has answered these questions.129  Prior to the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991 (CRA),130 backpay and attorneys’ fees were the only 
monetary recoveries available to Title VII plaintiffs.131  In the pre-CRA 
case of Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,132 the Court considered how a loss 
of backpay would affect Title VII: 
If employers faced only the prospect of an injunctive order, they 
would have little incentive to shun practices of dubious legality.  It 
is the reasonably certain prospect of a backpay award that 
provide[s] the spur or catalyst which causes employers and unions 
to self-examine and to self-evaluate their employment 
practices . . . .133 
According to Albemarle, backpay awards are crucial to achieving 
Title VII’s primary objective of deterring misconduct.134  In contrast, 
backpay is not needed under the NLRA because of the law’s ancillary 
                                                          
 126. Pollard v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 532 U.S. 843, 853 (2001); 
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 419 (1975). 
 127. Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7, 11–12 (1940). 
 128. See Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 545 (1999) (“[Title VII’s] 
primary objective is a prophylactic one; it aims, chiefly, not to provide redress but to 
avoid harm.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); Faragher v. City of 
Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 805–06 (1998) (noting that the main objective of Title VII 
is to prevent the harm of unlawful employment discrimination). 
 129. See Albemarle Paper, 422 U.S. at 417–18 (maintaining that backpay has a 
significant deterrent effect on employers, and that, without it, they would have little 
incentive to avoid illegal practices). 
 130. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 131. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1), (k) (2006); David J. Willbrand, Comment, Better 
Late Than Never?  The Function and Role of After-Acquired Evidence in Employment 
Discrimination Litigation, 64 U. CIN. L. REV. 617, 623 (1996). 
 132. 422 U.S. 405 (1975). 
 133. Id. at 417 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 134. Id. at 417–18. 
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deterrence objectives.  The Hoffman Court addressed this point 
explicitly, holding that the “spur and catalyst” provided by backpay in 
Title VII cases can be achieved through non-monetary remedies 
under the NLRA.135 
Unfortunately, given subsequent changes to Title VII’s remedial 
landscape, Albemarle provides only limited guidance to the current 
debate.  The decision was written at a time when backpay and 
attorneys’ fees were the only monetary recoveries available to Title 
VII plaintiffs.  When Congress enacted the CRA, it found that 
“additional remedies under Federal law [were] needed to deter 
unlawful harassment and intentional discrimination in the 
workplace.”136  Under an anti-gutting view (which holds that backpay 
restrictions would not fundamentally harm Title VII), the CRA 
substituted compensatory and punitive damages for backpay as the 
primary means for achieving deterrence.  The availability of 
compensatory and punitive damages “serve[s] as a necessary 
deterrent to future acts of discrimination, both for those held liable 
for damages as well as the employer community as a whole.”137  
Accordingly, those who support diminished rights argue that 
removing backpay would not gut Title VII at all.138  Rather, the threat 
of having to pay large sums of compensatory and punitive damages 
serves Title VII’s prophylactic aims even in the absence of backpay 
awards.139 
Although the anti-gutting argument provides some intuitive 
appeal, it relies on a flawed reading of legislative history.  The 
purpose of adding compensatory and punitive damages to Title VII 
was to supplement, rather than to supplant, backpay in order to deter 
misconduct.140  Congress believed that the threat of Title VII’s entire 
complement of remedies would most effectively prevent potential 
acts of discrimination.141 
                                                          
 135. See Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 152 (2002) 
(citing Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 904 (1984)). 
 136. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 2, 105 Stat. 1071, 1071 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (emphasis added). 
 137. H.R. REP. NO. 102-40(I), at 69 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 607. 
138.   See, e.g., Senn, supra note 122, at 172–73 (adopting an anti-gutting view of 
backpay limitations in Title VII cases). 
 139. See Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 545 (1999) (stating that Title 
VII is designed “chiefly[] not to provide redress but to avoid harm” (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 140. See Pollard v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 532 U.S. 843, 852 (2001) 
(noting that Congress intended the new remedies to supplement the remedies 
previously available under Title VII). 
 141. See Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1067 (9th Cir. 2004) (discussing 
deterrence under Title VII). 
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The fact that Congress intended backpay to work in conjunction 
with compensatory and punitive damages, however, does not 
necessarily lead to equalized rights in Title VII cases.  It is just as clear 
that Congress intended to extend backpay and reinstatement to 
victims of labor law discrimination.  Nonetheless, the Supreme Court 
believed that a backpay restriction would not fundamentally 
undermine the NLRA.142  Thus, the question is not whether 
eliminating backpay would weaken Title VII’s ability to achieve its 
deterrence objective—it would.  The question is whether restricting 
backpay would gut Title VII altogether. 
Proponents of diminished rights in Title VII cases argue that the 
“potentially lucrative remedies” of compensatory and punitive 
damages alone will effectively deter future Title VII violations.143   
The functional reality of Title VII litigation, however, suggests 
otherwise.  Compensatory and punitive damages are not available for 
disparate impact claims;144 therefore, a backpay limitation would 
completely gut Title VII in these cases.  Even for plaintiffs claiming 
disparate treatment, backpay is often the only remedy available.   
An employer’s conduct may not constitute the kind of malice or 
reckless indifference necessary to warrant punitive damages.145  
Compensatory damages for the embarrassment, humiliation, and 
emotional distress caused by an employer’s discriminatory acts can be 
intangible and difficult to prove.146  Although the Albemarle Court held 
that the “reasonably certain prospect of a backpay award” discourages 
illegal conduct, the speculative nature of compensatory and punitive 
damages cannot have the same effect.147 
Finally, injunctive relief—the centerpiece of Hoffman’s claim that 
employers do not “get off ‘scot-free’”—will rarely be available to 
unauthorized immigrants who sue under Title VII for intentional 
discrimination.148  The IRCA bars unauthorized immigrants from 
                                                          
 142. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 152 (2002). 
 143. See Senn, supra note 122, at 172–73 (arguing that a backpay limitation leaves 
victims of discrimination with other effective remedies). 
 144. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b) (2006) (limiting compensatory and punitive 
damages to cases of intentional discrimination); see also Panach, supra note 104, at 
947–48 (discussing remedies available in disparate impact cases). 
 145. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1) (2006). 
 146. See Ho & Chang, supra note 22, at 513 n.190 (describing emotional distress 
injuries as “notoriously intangible”). 
 147. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417 (1975). 
 148. See Schnapper, supra note 101, at 48 (“For an undocumented alien, monetary 
relief will usually be the only possible remedy.”). 
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receiving reinstatement,149 and courts have refused to grant injunctive 
relief to Title VII plaintiffs who fail to seek reinstatement.150 
Reduced to its functional reality, a ban on backpay would leave 
unauthorized immigrants with no viable remedy in most Title VII 
cases.  This outcome severely curtails the effective enforcement of 
antidiscrimination protections in the workplace—norms that benefit 
unauthorized workers and citizens alike. 
Hoffman is less concerned with how remedial limitations harm 
unauthorized immigrants than with the damage done to the 
workplace protection at issue.  The Hoffman Court found that 
national labor goals could be achieved even if certain employees were 
barred from recovering backpay.151  The same cannot be said of Title 
VII.  If the price of discrimination fluctuates based on a plaintiff’s 
immigration status, Title VII cannot effectively deter employers from 
engaging in illegal conduct. 
3. Gutting wage protections 
 Scholars generally share the view that Hoffman will not diminish 
unauthorized workers’ ability to assert FLSA claims.152  Nearly every 
judge to rule on the issue has agreed, holding that unauthorized 
immigrants remain covered by wage protections.153  These courts note 
that backpay under the FLSA represents wages for work already 
performed, while backpay under the NLRA represents wages for work 
never performed because of an illegal discharge.154  Although 
accurate, the distinction fails to explain why the former type of loss 
should be compensated while the latter should not.  As explained 
below, an analysis based on statutory gutting provides a clearer basis 
for immunizing the FLSA from remedial limitations than a critique 
based on different statutory definitions of “backpay.” 
                                                          
 149. See Griffith, supra note 28, at 130 n.26 (discussing reinstatement of 
unauthorized workers). 
 150. See, e.g., Cardenas v. Massey, 269 F.3d 251, 265 (3d Cir. 2001) (denying 
plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief); Carmichael v. Birmingham Saw Works, 738 
F.2d 1126, 1136 (11th Cir. 1984) (same). 
 151. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 152 (2002). 
 152. See Rebecca Smith et al., Low Pay, High Risk:  State Models for Advancing 
Immigrant Workers’ Rights, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 597, 606 (2004) (noting 
that immigrant advocates are concerned about Hoffman’s effect on Title VII, not the 
FLSA); Seitz, supra note 23, at 407–08 (same). 
153. See Part I (discussing post-Hoffman decisions involving wage and discrimination 
claims). 
154.  See, e.g., Chellen v. John Pickle Co., 446 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1277 (N.D. Okla. 
2006); Zavala v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 2d 295, 323 (D.N.J. 2005); 
Galaviz-Zamora v. Brady Farms, Inc., 230 F.R.D. 499, 501–03 (W.D. Mich. 2005); 
Reyes v. Van Elk, Ltd., 56 Cal. Rptr. 3d 68, 70 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007). 
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 Backpay protects different interests, depending on the 
employment protection at issue.  Under Title VII and the NLRA, 
backpay most commonly compensates employees for “lost future 
earnings”155—i.e., remunerable work lost because of an illegal 
discharge.156  Under the FLSA, backpay compensates employees for 
wages earned but not paid.157  The Hoffman Court refused “to award 
backpay to an illegal alien for years of work not performed.”158  
Because plaintiffs in FLSA actions have already performed work, 
advocates assert that Hoffman is inapplicable to such cases.  Although 
this is a sound basis to distinguish the facts of Hoffman from specific 
FLSA actions, the significance of the distinction remains unclear.   
In fact, even in cases involving lost work, such as an illegal discharge 
under the NLRA or Title VII, “backpay” compensates an employee 
for a cognizable loss, and a court that denies the remedy leaves a 
plaintiff less than whole. 
  FLSA plaintiffs undoubtedly suffer a tangible loss when they work 
for an employer without pay.  But employees fired for union 
organizing also suffer a tangible harm:  lost work due to the 
employer’s anti-union animus.159  Consistent with this principle, 
courts limit backpay awards under the NLRA to the employee’s actual 
loss.160  Just as a plaintiff’s right to recover backpay under the FLSA 
accrues when an employer fails to tender compensation for work 
performed, the employee’s right to recover backpay under the NLRA 
accrues when she is unemployed and seeking work following an 
illegal discharge.161  By the time either employee appears in court, she 
has suffered a definite injury (unpaid work or unemployment).  If the 
employee in the labor context can be left less than whole, why not the 
plaintiff who has worked without pay? 
Perhaps the past work/lost work distinction carries more force 
when viewed from the perspective of the employer.  It might appear 
that the FLSA violator enjoys a windfall of unpaid labor, while the 
                                                          
 155. Griffith, supra note 28, at 130. 
 156. Smith et al., supra note 152, at 606. 
 157. See, e.g., id. (distinguishing between the two types of backpay); Vu & Schwartz, 
supra note 96, at 45–46 (same). 
 158. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 149 (2002). 
 159. See Ruben J. Garcia, Ghost Workers in an Interconnected World:  Going Beyond the 
Dichotomies of Domestic Immigration and Labor Laws, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 737, 749–
50 (2003) (noting that backpay serves as a proxy for the wages an employee would 
have earned in the absence of discrimination). 
 160. See Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 198 (1941) (noting that all 
mitigating factors should be taken into account). 
 161. Anne Marie O’Donovan, Immigrant Workers and Workers’ Compensation After 
Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 299, 
312–13 (2006). 
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NLRA violator does not.  But employers who commit unfair labor 
practices without having to pay for them enjoy “ill-gotten gains” as 
well.162  The employer who violates the NLRA normally pays a price 
for the “benefit” of illegal discrimination in the form of backpay.   
If this price is reduced to zero, the employer can discriminate for 
free, putting him at a comparative advantage over nondiscriminating 
employers.  Put another way, the NLRA diminishes a perfectly at-will 
relationship by reducing employers’ freedom to hire and fire whom 
they please.  Employers who violate the NLRA without cost enjoy 
greater freedom in making employment decisions.  If courts 
eliminate backpay, the FLSA violator enjoys free labor and the NLRA 
violator enjoys free discrimination. 
In comparison to the past work/lost work distinction, statutory 
gutting provides a more persuasive basis for preventing diminished 
rights in wage cases.  The FLSA was designed to combat Depression-
era wages by establishing minimum working standards that are 
“remedial, with a humanitarian end in view.”163  Those who support 
diminished rights might argue that remedial limitations under the 
FLSA are no different than restricting backpay under the NLRA—
another workplace protection with a compensatory remedial scheme.  
Whether the unauthorized worker asserts a claim under the FLSA or 
NLRA, he seeks to recover “wages that could not lawfully have been 
earned . . . [from] a job obtained in the first instance by a criminal 
fraud.”164 
But the argument in favor of diminished rights ignores the 
difference between an employment statute’s remedial scheme and its 
substantive purpose.  The two are one and the same for the FLSA, but 
not for the NLRA.  Although backpay under the NLRA is designed to 
serve compensatory ends in order to combat discrimination, the 
statute’s primary function is to encourage collective bargaining 
through voluntary agreements.165  In fact, the Supreme Court has 
explicitly barred the NLRB from imposing substantive working 
conditions on employers and unions.166  The remedy of backpay—
though undoubtedly compensatory in nature—ultimately serves the 
                                                          
 162. See Rogers v. Loether, 467 F.2d 1110, 1121 (7th Cir. 1972) (“The retention of 
‘wages’ which would have been paid but for the statutory violation (of improper 
discharge) might well be considered ‘ill-gotten gains’; ultimate payment restores the 
situation to that which would have existed had the statute not been violated.”). 
 163. See Charnesky, supra note 76, at 393–94 (quoting Fleming v. Hawkeye Pearl 
Button Co., 113 F.2d 52, 56 (8th Cir. 1940)) (discussing the FLSA’s goals). 
 164. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 148–49 (2002). 
 165. NLRB v. Am. Nat’l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 401–02 (1952). 
 166. Id. at 402; Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7, 10–11 (1940). 
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NLRA’s procedural goal of encouraging self-organization and 
collective bargaining.167 
In contrast, the FLSA’s remedies directly support the statute’s 
substantive purpose, which is to improve working conditions by 
setting overtime and minimum wage rates.  Thus, although the 
Supreme Court tolerated diminished rights in NLRA cases on the 
assumption that the objectives of national labor policy could be 
achieved even without backpay, the same is not true for wage 
protections.  The connection between the FLSA’s remedial scheme 
and its statutory purpose is evinced by the nondiscretionary nature of 
backpay under the FLSA, as compared to Title VII and the NLRA.  
Although the latter statutes leave backpay determinations to the 
equitable discretion of the courts,168 the remedy is mandatory under 
the FLSA.169  Thus, the FLSA leaves no room for any type of Hoffman-
inspired balancing between federal labor and immigration objectives.  
A court that evaluates the effect that an award of unpaid wages would 
have on immigration-related incentives simply ignores the mandatory 
nature of the remedy under the FLSA.  Thus, eliminating backpay 
under the FLSA would not only undermine the statute’s ability to 
attain its stated purpose, it would blot out explicit statutory text 
requiring the remedy upon a finding of liability. 
The few judges who have argued in favor of denying unauthorized 
immigrants the ability to recover minimum wages fail to address the 
issue of statutory gutting.170  Rather than focus on the harm done to 
wage laws when backpay is denied, they focus on the harm done to 
immigration laws when backpay is awarded.  Under this view, allowing 
unauthorized immigrants to recover unpaid wages trivializes the 
IRCA and encourages new border violations.171  But an approach that 
                                                          
 167. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006); see also NLRB v. Fin. Inst. Employees of Am., Local 
1182, 475 U.S. 192, 208 (1986) (noting that the NLRA is designed to preserve 
industrial peace); Ho & Chang, supra note 22, at 509–10 (arguing that the NLRA’s 
procedural framework is not designed to achieve substantive goals in bargaining). 
 168. See Willbrand, supra note 131, at 642 n.152 (discussing mandatory and 
permissive nature of backpay awards under different statutes).  Compare 29 U.S.C.  
§ 216(b) (2006) (“shall” in the FLSA), with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (2006) (“may” 
in Title VII), and 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (2006) (“may” in the NLRA). 
 169. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2006). 
 170. See, e.g., In re Reyes, 814 F.2d 168, 171 (5th Cir. 1987) (Jones, J., dissenting) 
(discussing the immigration-related justifications for denying unauthorized 
immigrants the ability to recover unpaid wages); Patel v. Sumani Corp., 660 F. Supp. 
1528, 1531 (N.D. Ala. 1987), rev’d sub nom. Patel v. Quality Inn S., 846 F.2d 700  
(11th Cir. 1988) (holding that the FLSA’s wage protections conflict with the INA); 
Ulloa v. Al’s All Tree Serv., Inc., 768 N.Y.S.2d 556, 558 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. 2003) (noting 
in dicta that “Hoffman would require that the wage claim be disallowed in its 
entirety”). 
 171. In re Reyes, 814 F.2d at 172 (Jones, J., dissenting); Ulloa, 768 N.Y.S.2d at 558. 
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fails to consider the effect remedial limitations have on workplace 
protections ignores Hoffman’s central point.  The Supreme Court 
limited remedies in NLRA cases precisely because labor law would 
remain relatively unblemished in the wake of such losses.  A different 
outcome is required in wage cases, however, because stripping 
backpay from the FLSA is equivalent to eliminating the FLSA itself. 
III. INCENTIVES FOR ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION 
The future rights of unauthorized workers will depend not only on 
the functional concerns discussed above, but also on the impact 
equalized rights have on immigration policy.  In its jurisprudence on 
unauthorized workers, the Supreme Court has considered whether 
extending employment protections encourages illegal immigration.  
The Sure-Tan and Hoffman Courts approached the subject from very 
different vantages and, not surprisingly, came to different results.   
In Sure-Tan, the Court focused almost exclusively on the employer-
related incentives created by denying coverage under the NLRA.172  
The Court stated: 
If an employer realizes that there will be no advantage under the 
NLRA in preferring illegal aliens to legal resident workers, any 
incentive to hire such illegal aliens is correspondingly lessened.  In 
turn, if the demand for undocumented aliens declines, there may 
then be fewer incentives for aliens themselves to enter in violation 
of the federal immigration laws.173 
Under the Sure-Tan Court’s approach, an employee’s incentive to 
immigrate is subordinate to the more important factors that 
influence an employer’s hiring decisions.  A business will be less likely 
to employ an unauthorized worker who can assert claims for 
workplace violations; the drop in employer demand created by 
equalized rights will have the secondary effect of impacting the 
immigration-related decisions of foreign nationals.  By diminishing 
an immigrant’s exploitability, work law serves immigration law.174 
Hoffman moves from an employer-based framework to one 
centered on the choices made by unauthorized immigrants.   
The employee in Hoffman admitted to tendering false documents in 
order to obtain employment.175  Awarding the employee backpay 
                                                          
 172. 467 U.S. 883, 893–94 (1984). 
 173. Id. 
 174. Although the Supreme Court considered whether a backpay award would 
cause the five Sure-Tan workers to cross the border illegally, id. at 893–94, the Court 
never engaged in a broad analysis of immigration-related incentives from the 
perspective of immigrants generally. 
 175. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 141 (2002). 
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“would encourage the successful evasion of apprehension by 
immigration authorities, condone prior violations of the immigration 
laws, and encourage future violations.”176  According to the Hoffman 
Court, a ban on backpay discourages immigrants from crossing the 
border, obtaining employment, and remaining in the country.177 
Both Sure-Tan and Hoffman rely on the questionable assumption 
that employment law remedies impact the stakeholders’ incentives.  
Causes that more directly affect illegal immigration include poverty 
in countries of origin,178 globalization,179 and underenforcement of 
the IRCA.180  Unauthorized immigrants rarely know their employment 
rights.181  If they are willing to risk injury and death to come to the 
United States, the Supreme Court’s decisions will not dampen their 
determination. 
In contrast to the negligible effect they have on a noncitizen’s 
decision to immigrate illegally, changes in employment law could 
theoretically alter an employer’s calculus.  Congress focused on 
employer conduct when it designed the IRCA.182  Believing that 
“[e]mployment is the magnet that attracts aliens here illegally,”183 
Congress attempted to diminish employers’ economic incentives to 
hire unauthorized immigrants through the IRCA’s work verification 
system.184  Both the Sure-Tan Court and the IRCA attempted to raise 
                                                          
 176. Id. at 151. 
 177. See id. (holding that awarding backpay would encourage illegal border 
crossing). 
 178. See Linda S. Bosniak, Exclusion and Membership:  The Dual Identity of the 
Undocumented Worker Under United States Law, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 955, 990 (1988) 
(describing American demand for low-wage, low-skilled labor as one of many causes 
of illegal immigration); Lori A. Nessel, Undocumented Immigrants in the Workplace:   
The Fallacy of Labor Protections and the Need for Reform, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 345, 
358 (2001) (discussing economic disparities between the United States and sending 
countries). 
 179. See Nessel, supra note 178, at 358 (discussing global factors influencing 
international migration). 
 180. See Jarod S. Gonzalez, Employment Law Remedies for Illegal Immigrants, 40 TEX. 
TECH L. REV. 987, 997 (2008) (discussing the need for greater enforcement of the 
IRCA). 
 181. See Ontiveros, supra note 86, at 630 (challenging the contention that 
workplace protections encourage unauthorized immigrants to come to the United 
States). 
 182. See Catherine L. Fisk & Michael J. Wishnie, The Story of Hoffman Plastic 
Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB:  Labor Rights Without Remedies for Undocumented Immigrants, 
in LABOR LAW STORIES 399, 406 (Laura J. Cooper & Catherine L. Fisk eds., 2005) 
(discussing the IRCA’s focus on punishing employers that hire unauthorized 
immigrants). 
 183. H.R. REP. NO. 99-682(I), at 46 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 
5649–50. 
 184. See NLRB v. A.P.R.A. Fuel Oil Buyers Group, Inc., 134 F.3d 50, 55–58  
(2d Cir. 1997) (noting that “IRCA was passed to reduce the incentives for employers 
to hire illegal aliens”). 
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the costs of hiring unauthorized immigrants—Sure-Tan by extending 
labor law protections to all workers and the IRCA by fining employers 
who hire unauthorized immigrants. 
Given the IRCA’s legislative backdrop and Sure-Tan’s employer-
based frame, it is remarkable that the Hoffman Court focused 
exclusively on the illegal conduct of immigrant employees.185  
Critiques of Hoffman have failed to account for this crucial analytical 
shift from employer- to employee-based incentives.  Instead, most 
judges and scholars critical of Hoffman argue that backpay limitations 
increase the likelihood that businesses will hire these employees.186  
Despite its cogency, the argument fails to provide a basis for limiting 
Hoffman.187  The Supreme Court cited but rejected the contention 
that remedial restrictions make unauthorized immigrants relatively 
more attractive to employers.188  Rather, Hoffman focuses on the 
choices of immigrants “who themselves ha[ve] committed serious 
criminal acts.”189  It is time to consider the Court’s analytical frame 
and examine the role played by employee-based incentives in other 
statutory contexts. 
A. Rewarding Illegal Behavior 
The Supreme Court’s discourse on unauthorized immigrants takes 
a decidedly moralistic tone when workplace rights are at issue.  
Hoffman speaks of “condon[ing]” unauthorized immigrants’ past 
crimes.190  Rather than discussing the employer’s admitted unfair 
labor practices, Hoffman elaborates on the employee’s “criminal 
fraud.”191  Granting backpay to such a worker would “reward[]” his 
past misbehavior.192 
                                                          
 185. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 149 (2002). 
 186. See, e.g., Flores v. Limehouse, No. 2:04-1295-CWH, 2006 WL 1328762, at *2 
(D.S.C. May 11, 2006) (arguing that a ban on backpay provides employers with 
“incentives to hire unauthorized aliens thereby defeating IRCA’s purpose of 
reducing employment opportunities for unauthorized aliens”); Reyes v. Van Elk, 
Ltd., 56 Cal. Rptr. 3d 68, 77 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (noting that employers often know 
when they are hiring unauthorized immigrants); Cameron, supra note 61, at 31–32 
(noting that a backpay limitation likely invokes fear of deportation in undocumented 
workers and precludes them from pursuing actions against employers); Ho & Chang, 
supra note 22, at 489–90 (discussing employers’ incentives to hire unauthorized 
immigrants). 
 187. See Vu & Schwartz, supra note 96, at 43 (“Seeing as this logic has been 
considered and rejected by the Court, restating it cannot serve as a valid way to 
distinguish Hoffman.”). 
 188. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 152. 
 189. Id. at 143. 
 190. Id. at 151. 
 191. Id. at 149. 
 192. Id. at 145. 
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The first step in deciding whether backpay under Title VII or the 
FLSA might constitute a similar reward is to determine the specific 
illegal behavior at issue in Hoffman.  When the Hoffman Court wrote 
about condoning Jose Castro’s “serious misconduct,”193 exactly what 
misconduct was the Court seeking to curb?  If the objectionable 
behavior was Mr. Castro’s unauthorized presence in the United 
States, then the rewards rationale could apply broadly to 
unauthorized immigrants asserting wage and discrimination claims as 
well.  The INA permits the removal of foreign nationals who have 
entered the United States without inspection or overstayed their visas, 
among other grounds.194  By definition, an unauthorized immigrant 
who sues under Title VII or the FLSA has committed some sort of 
INA violation.195  If he continues to stay in the country while 
prosecuting workplace claims, he successfully evades apprehension by 
immigration authorities.196  Thus, the most expansive view of the 
rewards rationale would bar claims brought by any person present in 
the country illegally. 
But there is little support for such a wide reading of the Court’s 
discourse on incentives.  Nothing in the case law suggests that 
unauthorized immigrants should be denied access to courts, and 
Hoffman itself assumes the continued coverage of unauthorized 
immigrants under the NLRA.197  The Hoffman Court focused not on 
Mr. Castro’s illegal presence in the United States, but on “a legal 
landscape now significantly changed” by the IRCA.198  The Court 
stated, “IRCA forcefully made combating the employment of illegal 
aliens central to [t]he policy of immigration law.”199  Thus, it was  
Mr. Castro’s document fraud (and not his illegal presence) that was 
the primary focus of the Court’s rewards critique.200 
If an unauthorized immigrant obtains employment in the same way 
as Mr. Castro and proceeds to sue under Title VII or the FLSA, 
                                                          
 193. Id. at 146. 
 194. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (2006) (listing various classes of deportable aliens);  
see also Legomsky, supra note 25, at 487, 499 (2007) (discussing immigration-related 
violations). 
 195. Many unauthorized immigrants—up to forty percent of the population—
commit the non-criminal INA violation of overstaying their visa.  PASSEL, supra note 1, 
at 1; Smith et al., supra note 152, at 625 n.184. 
 196. See Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 149 (expressing concern that “alien-employee[s] 
would . . . successfully evad[e] apprehension by immigration authorities”). 
 197. See Schnapper, supra note 101, at 49 (arguing against Hoffman’s application to 
other claims); see also supra Part III.C (discussing the “wider lens” of incentives). 
 198. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 147. 
 199. Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted). 
 200. See id. at 149 (discussing the importance of the employment verification 
system). 
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similar rewards concerns are present.  For example, a backpay award 
given to an unauthorized immigrant who is the victim of racial 
discrimination could be viewed as sanctioning the plaintiff’s illegal 
use of documents to obtain employment in the first instance. 
The analysis might change if a plaintiff’s culpability were less than 
Mr. Castro’s or an employer’s culpability were greater than the 
employer in Hoffman.  The IRCA forbids immigrants from obtaining 
employment fraudulently201 and employers from knowingly hiring 
these workers.202  Hoffman involved a guilty-worker/innocent-
employer scenario because Mr. Castro tendered fraudulent 
documents without Hoffman’s knowledge.203  But what if an employer 
knowingly hires an unauthorized worker?  Several judges and 
commentators have argued that a diminished rights outcome should 
not occur in cases involving such “guilty employers.”204  There are two 
possible guilty-employer scenarios, one involving an innocent job 
applicant and one in which both parties commit document fraud 
together.  Consistent with the rewards rationale, employers who 
engage in document fraud alone should not receive backpay 
immunity.  The cases the Hoffman Court relied on to strike labor 
remedies for unauthorized workers involved employees who 
committed crimes at worksites.205  In an innocent-worker/guilty-
employer scenario, there is no employee misconduct to reward; only 
the employer has violated the IRCA. 
But the innocent-worker/guilty-employer scenario is somewhat 
unusual.  The IRCA prohibits an employer from knowingly hiring an 
unauthorized immigrant, failing to review a job applicant’s 
paperwork, and continuing to employ a worker with the knowledge 
that she is an unauthorized immigrant.206  The only situation in which 
a worker is “innocent” and an employer is “guilty” occurs when a 
business fails to request any paperwork from a new hire  
                                                          
 201. 8 U.S.C. § 1324c (2006). 
 202. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (2006). 
 203. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 141. 
 204. See, e.g., Madeira v. Affordable Hous. Found., Inc., 469 F.3d 219, 236–37  
(2d Cir. 2006) (attempting to limit Hoffman based on the guilty-employer 
distinction); Singh v. Jutla, 214 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1061–62 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (same); 
O’Donovan, supra note 161, at 315–16 (arguing that backpay immunity should apply 
only to unknowing employers); Senn, supra note 122, at 158–59 (contending that 
Congress intended only to punish undocumented workers who obtained work 
through fraudulent means); Wishnie, supra note 10, at 511–12 (discussing the guilty-
employer distinction). 
 205. See Southern S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31, 46–47 (1942) (denying 
reinstatement to employees who violated a federal mutiny statute); NLRB v. Fansteel 
Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 257–58 (1939) (denying reinstatement to 
employees who engaged in an illegal seizure of a building). 
 206. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (2006). 
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(the employee does not violate the IRCA here because she has not 
tendered fraudulent documents).207  But the IRCA’s structure 
provides employers with few incentives to ignore documents 
altogether.  Employers can hire unauthorized workers and comply 
with the IRCA by simply accepting social security cards that appear 
genuine.208  The relative ease of compliance means that even 
employers who seek to hire unauthorized immigrants will be much 
more likely to give a cursory review of employee-provided paperwork 
rather than fail to ask for documents at all.209 
If both parties commit document fraud, courts face the choice of 
rewarding the employee’s misconduct with backpay or rewarding the 
employer’s IRCA violation with backpay immunity.  By extending the 
backpay limitation to knowing employers, courts would create a 
direct incentive to hire unauthorized immigrants.  Employers would 
weigh the reduction in employment liability gained by hiring 
unauthorized workers against the risk of IRCA fines.  Given the 
improbability of actual prosecution by immigration authorities,210 
many employers might seek to hire unauthorized workers as an 
explicit management strategy.  The moral hazard created by granting 
backpay immunity to guilty employers (even when employees also 
violate the IRCA) would pose a direct threat to the system of work 
verification that the Supreme Court has characterized as “crucial” to 
national immigration policy.211 
B. Encouraging Future Violations 
Although Hoffman’s rewards rationale speaks of “condon[ing] prior 
violations,”212 the decision has a future-oriented bent as well.   
A reward for past misconduct creates incentives for other immigrants 
to violate immigration laws.213  By limiting backpay under the NLRA, 
                                                          
 207. See Linton Joaquin & Charles Wheeler, Document Fraud Enforcement the Second 
Time Around:  Will the Right Lessons Be Learned?, 78 INTERPRETER RELEASES 473, 474 
(Mar. 12, 2001) (discussing IRCA violations). 
 208. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(1)(A) (2006). 
 209. See Collins Foods Int’l, Inc. v. INS, 948 F.2d 549, 554 (9th Cir. 1991) 
(recognizing congressional intent to make the verification process relatively easy for 
employers). 
 210. See Gonzalez, supra note 180, at 997 (discussing the low number of sanctions 
imposed on employers for violations of the IRCA). 
 211. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 147–48 (2002);  
see also Schnapper, supra note 101, at 47 (arguing against extending backpay 
immunity to knowing employers). 
 212. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 151 (emphasis added). 
 213. Id. at 150 (recognizing that “awarding backpay . . . condones and encourages 
future violations”); see also Martinez, supra note 54, at 677–78 (discussing the 
application of the Supreme Court’s incentives-based rationales in later cases). 
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the Supreme Court has attempted to discourage several types of 
misconduct, including entering the country illegally, evading 
apprehension once inside the country, and obtaining new 
employment through additional IRCA violations.214  As explained 
below, restricting remedies in wage and discrimination cases will not 
discourage any of the three behaviors the Supreme Court sought to 
curtail. 
Consider the incentive to immigrate illegally.  The Hoffman Court 
created a fiction whereby the denial of remedies under the NLRA 
would discourage people from immigrating illegally.  Given all of the 
factors driving a person’s decision to immigrate to the United States, 
the Court could not actually have believed that the speculative hope 
of recovering backpay from a labor law violation would alter an 
immigrant’s calculus.  The same fiction applies to Title VII.  Foreign 
nationals do not immigrate to the country illegally in order to win 
sexual harassment lawsuits.215 
The goal of discouraging border violations is only slightly less 
unrealistic in the FLSA context.  Given immigrants’ desire for higher-
paying jobs, a loss of the federal minimum wage might dissuade a few 
people from entering the United States illegally.216  But this is a 
questionable assumption given that unauthorized immigrants who 
currently enjoy minimum wage protections rarely assert this right 
even when they are paid below required levels.217  With the ability to 
earn wages in the United States that are up to ten times higher than 
in Mexico and Central America, unauthorized immigrants might still 
find American workplaces attractive even without minimum wage 
protections.218  Therefore, to have any real impact on border-crossing 
incentives, average wage rates for unauthorized immigrants would 
have to fall well below federally defined floors. 
Just as they fail to influence a worker’s decision to cross the border 
illegally, employment law remedies create no incentive to seek 
                                                          
 214. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 150–52; see Seitz, supra note 23, at 396 (discussing the 
Hoffman Court’s contention that backpay awards incentivize further illegal activity). 
 215. See Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 155 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that the 
possibility of future backpay awards does not create an incentive to immigrate);  
see also Griffith, supra note 28, at 136 (criticizing Hoffman’s incentives analysis). 
 216. See Neil A. Friedman, A Human Rights Approach to the Labor Rights of 
Undocumented Workers, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1715, 1742 (1986) (arguing that unauthorized 
immigrants are not likely to “base their immigration decisions on legal niceties”). 
 217. See Bosniak, supra note 178, at 986 (discussing unauthorized immigrants’ 
unwillingness to assert workplace claims); William B. Gould IV, Labor Law and Its 
Limits:  Some Proposals for Reform, 49 WAYNE L. REV. 667, 669 (2003) (describing 
immigrants who assert workplace claims following Hoffman as “audacious”). 
 218. Sylvia R. Lazos, Emerging Latina/o Nation and Anti-Immigrant Backlash, 7 NEV. 
L.J. 685, 695 n.68 (2007). 
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employment following an illegal discharge.  Nonetheless, the 
Supreme Court’s incentives-based rationale assumes that immigrants’ 
mitigation efforts encourage them to obtain additional work, thereby 
triggering more IRCA violations.219 
The Court’s reading of the mitigation principle is wrong both as a 
matter of theory and practice.  There is no “duty” to mitigate in that 
plaintiffs who fail to mitigate are not exposed to liability or barred 
from asserting their claims.220  Rather, employers have the burden of 
proving an employee’s failure to mitigate and can limit a plaintiff’s 
recovery by carrying this burden.  Courts reduce backpay awards by 
the wages an employee earned or should have earned following 
termination.221  Under this standard method for calculating backpay, 
an employee’s recovery should be exactly the same whether or not 
she obtains new employment222 because her award is reduced by the 
amount she earns in reality or earns hypothetically with reasonable 
diligence.223 
Although the Court is correct that unauthorized immigrants will 
likely obtain new employment following illegal discharges,224 the 
incentive flows from their need to replace wages, not from the 
mitigation principle.225  Most unauthorized immigrants earn 
                                                          
 219. See Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 150–51 (“Castro cannot mitigate damages, a duty our 
cases require, without triggering new IRCA violations, either by tendering false 
documents to employers or by finding employers willing to ignore IRCA and hire 
illegal workers.” (citations omitted)). 
 220. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 12.12, at 807 (3d ed. 1999) (“[T]he 
injured party incurs no liability to the party in breach by failing to take such steps.”); 
Howard C. Eglit, Damages Mitigation Doctrine in the Statutory Anti-Discrimination Context:  
Mitigating Its Negative Impact, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 7, 9 n.3 (2000) (preferring the term 
“mitigation principle”). 
 221. See, e.g., Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 197–98 (1941)  
(reducing backpay by “amounts which the workers failed without excuse to earn” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Fisk & Wishnie, supra note 182, at 404 
(discussing mitigation in relation to backpay under the NLRA). 
 222. See 5 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1039, at 242 (1964) (“[The] 
recovery against the defendant will be exactly the same whether [the plaintiff] makes 
the effort and mitigates his loss, or not . . . .”). 
 223. Given the discretionary nature of the remedy, a court may refuse to award 
any backpay to employees who do nothing to find replacement work.  But this should 
occur only if the wages the employees would have earned with reasonable diligence 
equal or exceed their actual lost wages.  Any reduction beyond that amount would 
conflict with the make-whole goal of Title VII and the NLRA.  See Ho & Chang, supra 
note 22, at 511 (discussing Title VII’s compensatory function). 
 224. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 150–51. 
 225. Employees who fail to mitigate properly are distinct from those who make 
themselves “unavailable” for work by leaving the labor market.  The former group 
remains eligible for backpay, less mitigation, while the latter group’s backpay claims 
are tolled during the period of unavailability.  See, e.g., Miller v. Marsh, 766 F.2d 490, 
492 (11th Cir. 1985) (denying backpay after the plaintiff left the job market to attend 
law school); Lundy Packing Co., 286 N.L.R.B. 141, 164 (1987) (tolling the plaintiff’s 
backpay award for the period of time when the plaintiff was incarcerated);  
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extremely low wages.226  If they are fired, these workers will find new 
work in order to feed themselves and their families, not out of a 
desire to properly mitigate losses for a future lawsuit. 227 
The same critique applies in the Title VII context.  Title VII’s 
backpay limitation states, “Interim earnings or amounts earnable with 
reasonable diligence by the person or persons discriminated against 
shall operate to reduce the back pay otherwise allowable.”228   
The employer defending a Title VII case must prove that the plaintiff 
failed to adequately obtain substantially equivalent employment.229  
But if the employer carries this burden, the plaintiff recovers the 
same amount (often nothing) as she would have received had she 
mitigated properly.230  As with the NLRA, Title VII’s mitigation 
principle does not encourage an unauthorized immigrant to find new 
work because the plaintiff’s post-termination conduct does not affect 
her backpay recovery.231 
The incentives created by hypothetical mitigation, tenuous as they 
are in labor and discrimination cases, are completely absent in wage 
cases because there is no duty to mitigate.  A plaintiff seeking unpaid 
wages under the FLSA has already performed services and cannot 
                                                          
see also A.P.R.A. Fuel Oil Buyers Group, Inc., 320 N.L.R.B. 408, 412 (1995) 
(discussing the availability doctrine as it applies to unauthorized immigrants).   
The Sure-Tan employees who resided in Mexico had left the American job market 
and were unavailable for work.  Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 904 (1984).  
Hoffman did not state whether the unauthorized immigration status of workers 
residing in the United States makes them unavailable for work.  See Hoffman, 535 U.S. 
at 159 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The Court, however, does not rely upon [the 
availability doctrine] as determining its conclusion.”). 
 226. JEFFREY S. PASSEL, UNAUTHORIZED MIGRANTS:  NUMBERS AND CHARACTERISTICS 
34 (2005), available at http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/46.pdf; see also Francine 
J. Lipman, The Taxation of Undocumented Immigrants:  Separate, Unequal, and Without 
Representation, 9 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 1, 16–17 (2006) (discussing wages of 
unauthorized immigrants in relation to national averages). 
 227. See PASSEL, supra note 226, at 30–35 (illustrating the dynamics of immigrant 
families and the demands on unauthorized immigrants as providers for their 
families). 
 228. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 229. Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 231 (1982); Hutchison v. Amateur 
Elec. Supply, Inc., 42 F.3d 1037, 1044 (7th Cir. 1994). 
 230. See Booker v. Taylor Milk Co., Inc., 64 F.3d 860, 866 (3d Cir. 1985) (“The 
plain language of section 2000e-5 shows that amounts that could have been earned 
with reasonable diligence should be used to reduce or decrease a backpay award, not to 
wholly cut off the right to any backpay.”).  But see Sellers v. Delgado Coll., 902 F.2d 
1189, 1196 (5th Cir. 1990) (denying backpay altogether for the plaintiff’s failure to 
mitigate). 
 231. Although a court may be disinclined to award backpay to employees who fail 
to search for work, any reduction that exceeds what was reasonably earnable conflicts 
with Title VII’s text requiring a “reduction” based on “earnable” wages.  See supra 
notes 223–230 and accompanying text. 
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reduce her losses by working for another employer.232  The wage 
claim does not encourage future violations of the IRCA because the 
plaintiff is not required to find new work.233 
In sum, employment law remedies do not cause workers to come to 
the United States or stay, despite the Supreme Court’s assumptions 
about the factors driving illegal immigration. 
C. The Wider Lens of Incentives 
The Supreme Court has stated that the goal of discouraging illegal 
immigration should be seen “through a wider lens.”234  Viewed 
uncritically, this statement could lead to diminished rights in all 
cases. 
When courts focus on the “wider lens” of incentives, rather than on 
the specific functional and policy-based arguments discussed above, 
they often compare unauthorized immigrants’ employment 
relationships to illegal contracts.235  But the comparison ignores the 
rules governing the enforcement of illegal contracts.  Although 
courts generally refuse to give effect to contracts formed with an 
illegal purpose, the finding of “illegality” does not end the inquiry.  
For example, courts are more likely to enforce illegal contracts when 
failure to do so would result in disproportionate forfeiture.236   
Such forfeiture would certainly occur if an unauthorized immigrant 
could not recover wages for work performed. 
Further, a contract that is made illegal by a particular regulation or 
statute may still be enforced if one of the contracting parties is a 
member of the class of persons protected by the statute.237  Although 
the IRCA bars the employment of unauthorized immigrants, 
Congress sought to protect the rights of unauthorized immigrants 
should they ultimately obtain employment.238  Thus, the finding of 
                                                          
 232. See Vu & Schwartz, supra note 96, at 47 (noting that FLSA plaintiffs cannot 
reduce their losses by obtaining alterative employment). 
 233. See, e.g., Madeira v. Affordable Hous. Found., Inc., 469 F.3d 219, 243  
(2d Cir. 2006) (noting that a backpay award under the FLSA does not condone  
prior immigration violations or continue them); Flores v. Albertsons, Inc.,  
No. CV0100515AHM (SHX), 2002 WL 1163623, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2002) 
(noting that successful FLSA claims do not cause employees to violate the IRCA). 
 234. Hoffman Plastics Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 147 (2002). 
 235. See, e.g., Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 384 F.3d 822, 833 (9th Cir. 2004) (Bea, J., 
dissenting) (“It is axiomatic that a contract with an illegal purpose bars enforcement 
of such contract; no damages are incurred by its breach.” (citations omitted)); Ulloa 
v. Al’s All Tree Serv., Inc., 768 N.Y.S.2d 556, 558 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. 2003) (stating that an 
employment contract with an unauthorized immigrant is “tainted with illegality”). 
 236. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 197 (1979). 
 237. Juliet P. Kostritsky, Illegal Contracts and Efficient Deterrence:  A Study in Modern 
Contract Theory, 74 IOWA L. REV. 115, 156–58 (1988). 
 238. See Part II.A (discussing the IRCA’s text and history). 
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illegality is only the starting point of the analysis, even if a wider lens 
is used. 
Detached from the language or purpose of the IRCA, the wider 
lens approach becomes a Rorschach test for judges.  Those strongly 
opposed to illegal immigration focus exclusively on the illegality of 
the employment relationship.239  Because the Supreme Court has 
announced many factors relevant to cases involving unauthorized 
workers without formulating a hierarchy of factors, a plaintiff’s 
unauthorized status becomes the sole focus of the analysis.240  Viewed 
broadly, the wider lens approach threatens not only the remedy of 
backpay, but also the ability of unauthorized workers to assert 
workplace claims at all. 
Although still among the minority, several judges have utilized a 
wider lens to argue that unauthorized workers should enjoy fewer 
rights under federal wage241 and antidiscrimination242 statutes.  These 
outcomes contradict most post-Hoffman decisions that continue to 
favor unauthorized workers’ rights and remedies.243  They also ignore 
Hoffman’s central premise, which is that courts may restrict remedies 
only to the extent that the underlying workplace protections remain 
intact.  Nonetheless, the wider lens view offers an attractively 
simplistic analysis:  denying recovery altogether discourages illegal 
employment relationships and supports national immigration 
objectives. 
IV. DIMINISHED RIGHTS, DECLINING CITIZENSHIP 
To this point, I have considered the rights of unauthorized workers 
in terms of statutory purpose and immigration policy.  By applying 
                                                          
 239. See Martinez, supra note 54, at 665 (arguing that the “wider lens” approach 
has “shifted the focus from protecting the rights of workers” to the workers’ 
immigration status). 
 240. Vu & Schwartz, supra note 96, at 47. 
 241. See, e.g., In re Reyes, 814 F.2d 168, 171 (5th Cir. 1987) (Jones, J., dissenting) 
(arguing in favor of distinguishing between citizens and unauthorized workers in 
FLSA cases); Patel v. Sumani Corp., 660 F. Supp. 1528, 1531 (N.D. Ala. 1987),  
rev’d sub nom. Patel v. Quality Inn S., 846 F.2d 700 (11th Cir. 1988) (questioning 
whether an unauthorized immigrant is “an individual,” as defined by the FLSA). 
 242. See, e.g., Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 384 F.3d 822, 834–35 (9th Cir. 2004) (Bea, J., 
dissenting) (rejecting the idea that antidiscrimination policies outweigh immigration 
policies); Egbuna v. Time-Life Libraries, Inc., 153 F.3d 184, 186–87 (4th Cir. 1998) 
(en banc) (per curiam) (rejecting a Title VII claim brought by an unauthorized 
immigrant); Escobar v. Spartan Sec. Serv., 281 F. Supp. 2d 895, 896–98 (S.D. Tex. 
2003) (dismissing a Title VII claim based on the plaintiff’s immigration status); 
Crespo v. Evergro Corp., 841 A.2d 471, 472 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004) 
(dismissing a state discrimination claim based on the plaintiff’s immigration status). 
 243. See Part I (discussing the courts’ treatment of unauthorized workers’ rights 
following Hoffman). 
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these criteria to wage and antidiscrimination protections, I have 
explained why the diminished rights outcome should not occur, but 
could.  Although the future rights of unauthorized immigrants will 
depend largely on how courts determine these issues of purpose and 
policy, the consequences of diminished rights are equally important.  
Here, I explain why reducing workplace protections harms both 
unauthorized immigrants and citizens. 
At its core, the Supreme Court’s denial of basic workplace 
remedies to unauthorized immigrants is rooted in notions of 
communitarianism.  A philosophy debated among political scientists 
and immigration theorists, communitarianism explains how fixed 
borders define the community and preserve scarce resources.244  From 
this perspective, extending membership rights to outsiders who have 
violated the country’s borders threatens democracy and membership 
for those lawfully present.245 
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on unauthorized workers 
implicitly fashions a communitarian vision of the workplace.   
The Hoffman Court denied Jose Castro the ability to recover monetary 
remedies for his illegal discharge because he had knowingly violated 
the nation’s immigration laws.246  If foreign nationals can cross the 
border at will, tender fraudulent documents, and assert workplace 
claims on par with citizens, then our nation’s “critical” system of 
verifying who belongs at the workplace would be undermined.247   
In order to reinforce the border—the nation’s primary mechanism 
for defining membership—employment protections cannot extend 
fully to outsiders.  Thus, Hoffman constructs a world in which citizens 
are allowed to seek redress for incidents of discrimination, relegating 
unauthorized workers to a lawless remedial realm to match their 
lawless existence in the community. 
Here I offer a theoretical response to the communitarian rationale 
for denying workplace rights to unauthorized immigrants.  I argue 
that employment protections are “rights of partial inclusion” because 
they reflect a distinctive sphere—the workplace—where 
unauthorized immigrants should be placed on par with citizens in 
                                                          
 244. Gordon & Lenhardt, supra note 9, at 2501.  See generally WALZER, supra note 
19, at 31–63 (considering how communities determine membership and the benefits 
that arise from such membership). 
 245. See Bosniak, supra note 178, at 1002–03 (discussing the liberal exclusionist 
view of immigration policy). 
246.   Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 149–50 (2002). 
247.   Id. at 151. 
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vindicating collective rights.248  Because of the communal nature of 
workplace rights that ensure better working conditions for all 
employees, I assert that employment protections are unlike other 
rights commonly discussed among communitarians, such as public 
benefits and legal status.  I explain why enforcing wage and 
antidiscrimination rights, even if only on an individual basis, 
constitutes collective action that ensures better working conditions 
for immigrants and citizens alike.  In contrast to arguments that favor 
restricting resources to lawful residents, I explain how, if applied 
broadly, employment protections can preserve community identity. 
A. Rights of Partial Inclusion 
What does it mean to work without rights?  What are the 
consequences of the ambiguous and diminished rights outcomes for 
citizens and immigrants?  The current decline in rights represents an 
upheaval of fundamental notions of citizenship.  Although the 
understanding of what constitutes “citizenship” varies widely across 
disciplines, sociologists, political theorists, and legal theorists 
generally describe citizenship in terms of “membership.”249  To be a 
citizen is to belong to a broader community.  The bonds that create 
membership are described disparately in terms of legal status, rights, 
political engagement, and self-identification.250 
Unauthorized immigrants do not fit neatly into any of these 
descriptions.  At first glance, it appears rather oxymoronic to refer to 
an “unauthorized immigrant citizen.”  This reaction derives largely 
from our status-based understanding of citizenship.  Citizenship is 
associated primarily with legally recognized membership in the 
political community.  By definition, unauthorized immigrants are 
excluded from this group.251 
But exclusion from one category of citizenship does not necessarily 
lead to exclusion from all others.  For example, one can be a rights-
based citizen—that is, enjoy some degree of civil and social rights—
without occupying any level of status citizenship.  The experiences of 
women and minorities in this country demonstrate that the converse 
                                                          
 248. I do not mean to suggest that by equalizing employment rights, unauthorized 
workers will enjoy the same wages, working conditions, or ability to assert those rights 
as citizens.  There is a large difference between possessing workplace rights and 
having the ability to assert them.  See infra text accompanying note 329 (discussing 
the limits of equalized rights). 
 249. See LINDA BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN:  DILEMMAS OF CONTEMPORARY 
MEMBERSHIP 18–20 (2006) (discussing theories of citizenship). 
 250. Id. at 20; see also Gordon & Lenhardt, supra note 9, at 2500 (noting that “the 
term ‘citizenship’ is not a unitary concept”). 
 251. Bosniak, supra note 8, at 461–62. 
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is true:  many status citizens have lacked basic political and social 
rights throughout American history.252  Likewise, unauthorized 
immigrants’ lack of formal citizenship does not necessarily implicate 
their standing as rights-based citizens.  In fact, until recently, 
employment law extended equal rights to unauthorized 
immigrants.253 
The notion of partial inclusion derives from theories of social 
citizenship and equal citizenship discussed among political scientists 
and social theorists.  T.H. Marshall’s essay, Citizenship and Social 
Class,254 introduced the theory of rights-based citizenship.255  Marshall 
asserted that individuals must possess a complete collection of 
rights—civil rights, political rights, and social rights—in order to 
enjoy full citizenship.256  According to Marshall, the ability to exercise 
all of these rights imbues in the holder “a direct sense of community 
membership based on loyalty to a civilization which is a common 
possession.”257 
Similar to the manner in which Marshall’s discourse on citizenship 
has influenced social and political thought, Kenneth Karst’s notion of 
citizenship as “belonging”258 has greatly impacted citizenship talk 
among legal theorists.259  Karst states, “The principle of equal 
citizenship presumptively insists that the organized society treats each 
individual as a person, one who is worthy of respect, one who 
                                                          
 252. See Jennifer Gordon & R.A. Lenhardt, Rethinking Work and Citizenship,  
55 UCLA L. REV. 1161, 1185–86 (2008) (noting that status citizens can lack civil and 
social rights). 
 253. There has never been perfect “equality” of employment rights between 
citizens and immigrants.  Some states restrict unemployment and workers’ 
compensation benefits to citizens or lawful residents.  Likewise, government 
employment may depend on immigration status.  See generally 1 A. PETER MUTHARIKA, 
Access to Economic Activity, in THE ALIEN UNDER AMERICAN LAW (1980 & Supp. 1984).  
However, with few exceptions, nearly every jurisdiction extended the core wage and 
antidiscrimination protections discussed here to unauthorized immigrants prior to 
Hoffman.  See Part I (discussing the historical development of employment rights for 
unauthorized immigrants). 
 254. T.H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class, in THE CITIZENSHIP DEBATES:   
A READER 93 (Gershon Shafir ed., 1998). 
 255. Bosniak, supra note 8, at 464. 
 256. See Joel F. Handler, The Paradox of Inclusion:  Social Citizenship and Active Labor 
Market Policies 6 (Univ. of Cal., L.A. Law Sch. Pub. Law Research Paper No. 01-20, 
2001), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=290927 
(discussing Marshall’s division of citizenship into three categories of rights). 
 257. T.H. MARSHALL, CLASS, CITIZENSHIP AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT 92 (1964). 
 258. Kenneth Karst, Foreword:  Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment,  
91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 6 (1976) [hereinafter Karst, Equal Citizenship].  See generally 
KENNETH KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA:  EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE CONSTITUTION 
(1989). 
 259. See, e.g., Gordon & Lenhardt, supra note 252, at 1186 (citing numerous 
writings by Karst to explain the application of the term “belonging” in discussing 
citizenship). 
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‘belongs.’”260  Equal constitutional and civil rights are key components 
of Karst’s belonging equation because “they nourish a vision of 
American society that emphasizes tolerance and the value of 
belonging.”261  Equal citizenship has both individual and collective 
components.  Civil rights allow the individual to pursue economic 
opportunities and cultural choices previously closed to him.262  At the 
same time, the individual’s decision to assert those rights serves 
society’s anti-caste ethic, while encouraging greater participation in 
public life and private markets.263 
Rights of partial inclusion, as I describe them, share many of the 
social and affective qualities of equal citizenship.  Those persons who 
hold rights of partial inclusion enjoy greater levels of acceptance and 
belonging within their communities.264  However, the theories of 
Marshall and Karst have only limited salience here because they 
concern the rights of formal citizens, not unauthorized immigrants.265  
The theory of partial inclusion is not as broad as Karst’s “ideal of 
equality” and “full membership.”266  By having the ability to assert 
employment rights, unauthorized immigrants further the community 
endeavor of ensuring fair treatment of all workers, but remain 
excluded from other matters.  For example, their rights of political 
participation are severely constrained, and they remain vulnerable to 
the reach of immigration law at all times. 
As a normative matter, I do not mean to suggest that partial 
inclusion should be the endpoint in defining the sphere of 
membership.  This is not an endorsement, but rather an 
acknowledgment of the second-class citizenship of unauthorized 
immigrants.  As Linda Bosniak has argued, even though advocates of 
“equal citizenship” characterize the denial of full rights as 
presumptively illegitimate, their focus remains on status citizens.267  
With unauthorized immigrants, the focus on universality falls away; 
the scholarship on equal citizenship either ignores the group 
altogether or implicitly endorses distinctions between formal citizens 
                                                          
 260. Karst, Equal Citizenship, supra note 258, at 6. 
 261. Kenneth L. Karst, Paths to Belonging:  The Constitution and Cultural Identity,  
64 N.C. L. REV. 303, 337 (1986). 
 262. Id. 
 263. Id. at 337–38. 
 264. See Gordon & Lenhardt, supra note 252, at 1187 (describing citizenship as 
“full acceptance within the local and national community”). 
 265. See id. at 1196–98 (arguing that scholarship on rights-based citizenship never 
“seriously engage[s] with immigration as a factor in the contemporary workplace”). 
 266. Karst, supra note 261, at 371. 
 267. See Linda Bosniak, Citizenship and Work, 27 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 497, 
500 (2000) (contrasting the negative connotation associated with second-class 
citizenship with the neutral classifications contained within status citizenship). 
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and aliens.268  Noncitizens are undoubtedly “partial members” of the 
community.269  The fact that they are subject to deportation—a threat 
citizens never face—means that unauthorized immigrants cannot 
enjoy the form of equal citizenship envisioned by Karst and others.270 
Acknowledging the second-class citizenship of unauthorized 
immigrants does not cede the argument over the extent of rights 
afforded to the group; there are gradations of second-class 
citizenship.271  Between having no rights and some rights, partial 
inclusion is a more palatable alternative to a growing trend of pure 
exclusion.  The concept of immigrant as “outlaw” is making a 
comeback.272  This movement, as reflected in the Supreme Court’s 
recent jurisprudence on unauthorized workers, is the result of a 
vacuum created by immigration law.  By defining who is “in” and who 
is “out,” immigration law leaves open the question of how to treat 
those who should be “out” but nevertheless make it “in.” 
One response is to deny all rights to members of the group so as to 
discourage their entry and encourage their swift departure.  The 
partial inclusion theory presented here offers an alternative method 
for filling the void.  It argues that both the immigrant and larger 
community (including status citizens) benefit from a broad 
application of workplace protections. 
The communal nature of workplace protections extends beyond 
the protections afforded by traditional labor law—such as the right to 
join a union and bargain collectively—to wage and antidiscrimination 
protections.  In fact, in some instances, the so called “individual 
rights” afforded by wage and antidiscrimination statutes can be more 
effective vehicles for achieving collective ends than traditional labor 
law currently allows.273  For example, by enabling unauthorized 
                                                          
 268. Id. at 500–51 (discussing the application of rights-based citizenship to the 
subject of work). 
 269. Kevin R. Johnson, “Aliens” and the U.S. Immigration Laws:  The Social and Legal 
Construction of Nonpersons, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 263, 271 (1997). 
 270. See id. (arguing that aliens are partial members of the community). 
 271. Gerald L. Neuman, Aliens as Outlaws:  Government Services, Proposition 187, and 
the Structure of Equal Protection Doctrine, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1425, 1428 (1995). 
 272. See ELIZABETH HULL, WITHOUT JUSTICE FOR ALL 86–87 (1985) (discussing the 
outlaw concept); see also Moreau v. Oppenheim, 663 F.2d 1300, 1307–08  
(5th Cir. 1981) (“We seriously doubt whether illegal entry, standing alone, makes 
outlaws of individuals, permitting their contracts to be breached without legal 
accountability.”); Neuman, supra note 271, at 1441 (criticizing the outlaw 
perspective). 
 273. See Benjamin I. Sachs, Employment Law as Labor Law, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2685, 
2721–44 (2007) (explaining how employment protections can serve as a locus for 
collective action among workers).  This approach contrasts with the typical 
characterization of employment protections as individual rights.  See, e.g., James J. 
Brudney, A Famous Victory:  Collective Bargaining Protections and the Statutory Aging 
Process, 74 N.C. L. REV. 939, 1026–27 (1996) (describing the proliferation of federal 
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immigrant women to sue for sexual harassment and recover 
appropriate remedies, Title VII grants plaintiffs partial membership 
rights in a community comprised of formal citizens and other 
employees.  Not only does the plaintiff defend her individual 
autonomy and personal dignity, she stands with other workers in 
pursuing the shared objective of attaining a discrimination-free 
workplace.  The individual enforcement of workplace norms benefits 
several groups of workers, including the plaintiff, her coworkers, and 
future employees who join a workplace reformed (hopefully) by their 
predecessor’s actions.  This collective endeavor—forming identity 
(i.e., “who we are”) and preserving rights (i.e., “what we have”)— 
is the precise undertaking of the communitarians. 
B. Preserving Community 
Communitarians defend the nation-state’s right to bounded 
citizenship.  In his seminal work, Spheres of Justice, Michael Walzer 
argues that countries may exclude outsiders in order to preserve 
national identities.274  Walzer notes that theories of distributive justice 
presuppose the existence of “a bounded world, a community within 
which distributions take place, a group of people committed to 
dividing, exchanging, and sharing, first of all among themselves.”275  
Hard borders preserve scarce benefits and define the community.276  
Walzer’s defense of bounded citizenship has both psychological and 
sociological qualities.  The nation-state’s fixed borders instill a feeling 
of belonging in those who reside within, while allowing them to 
protect the community’s rights and resources collectively.  If those 
who violate the border can make a claim on the community’s rights, 
society is less able to define its common purpose and pursue liberal 
values.277 
Much of the debate over borders comes down to what Peter Spiro 
describes as the “citizenship dilemma,” in which extending formal 
citizenship to more persons dilutes national identity.278  Spiro argues 
                                                          
statutes focused on individually enforced rights); Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law 
of the Workplace in an Era of Self-Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 319, 329 (2005) 
(discussing the rise of the individual rights model in response to the limitations of 
the collective bargaining model). 
 274. WALZER, supra note 19, at 31–63. 
 275. Michael Walzer, The Distribution of Membership, in BOUNDARIES:  NATIONAL 
AUTONOMY AND ITS LIMITS 1 (Peter G. Brown & Henry Shue eds., 1981). 
 276. See Gordon & Lenhardt, supra note 9, at 2501 (noting scholarly critiques of 
communitarian arguments). 
 277. See Peter Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 
88–89 (1984) (describing communitarian values as reflecting “vague, even circular, 
notions of social expectations and relationships”). 
 278. Peter J. Spiro, The Citizenship Dilemma, 51 STAN. L. REV. 597, 599 (1999). 
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that as residents develop increasing loyalties to nonstate 
communities, America becomes “inclusive but inevitably weak.”279  
The theory of partial inclusion demonstrates how arguments over 
status citizenship fail to delineate the bounds of rights-based 
citizenship.  Even if granting formal citizenship to more residents 
diminishes national identity (a questionable assumption), extending 
rights of partial inclusion to unauthorized immigrants does just the 
opposite.  When unauthorized immigrants possess the formal power 
to challenge exploitation at the workplace, the notion of who “we” 
are is strengthened.  Conversely, when courts relegate residents to a 
lawless working subclass—as in Hoffman—a nation cannot seriously 
define itself in egalitarian terms, even if only aspirationally.280 
Communitarian dialogue often glosses over the precise “rights” 
and “benefits” bounded citizenship preserves.  The most fundamental 
benefit at stake, of course, is immigration status itself.  Formal status 
is a scarce resource in the sense that only a certain number of people 
can enter the country before residents lose faith in the purpose of 
national boundaries.  The tradeoff has been characterized as an 
“admissions-status” dynamic, in which the expansion of immigrant 
rights reduces support for large-scale immigration.281  The more the 
state formally recognizes immigrants, the less likely citizens will 
tolerate increased admissions.282  This dynamic played out in the 
1980s when Congress granted legal status to over two million 
unauthorized immigrants in exchange for increased border 
protection and workplace enforcement.283  The same tradeoff is 
present in today’s immigration reform proposals that require the 
government to seal the border in exchange for a large-scale 
legalization program.284 
Employment protections do not require the same kind of tradeoff 
as represented by the admissions-status dynamic.  Immigrants 
constitute a crucial portion of the workforce needed to enforce 
                                                          
 279. See id. at 601 (noting that the thinning of the American identity is 
“perhaps . . . not a bad thing”). 
 280. See Maria Pabón López, The Intersection of Immigration Law and Civil Rights Law:  
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 282. Id. 
 283. Kobach, supra note 27, at 1330; Osuna, supra note 82, at 331. 
 284. See Michael J. Wishnie, Labor Law After Legalization, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1446, 
1446–48 (2008) (discussing immigration reform). 
 1408 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:1361 
employment laws.285  As the number of unauthorized workers 
increases,286 their exclusion from employment protections diminishes 
the group of would-be workplace enforcers.  With citizens standing 
alone as rights-holders, they become relatively more costly to employ, 
thereby diminishing employer demand for their services.287   
In contrast to the admissions-status dynamic, citizens should support 
workplace rights for unauthorized immigrants in order to equalize 
the labor market and enable all employees to secure protections 
reserved for the community. 
As with the comparison to status citizenship, employment rights 
cannot be analogized to public benefits—another scarce resource 
communitarians seek to protect.288  For example, political scientist 
Gary Freeman argues, “The welfare state . . . seeks to take care of its 
own, and its ability to do so is premised on its ability to construct a 
kind of safe house in which to shelter its members from the outside 
world.”289  The calculus is presented as a zero-sum game in which the 
rights of citizens decline at a rate proportionate to the gains made by 
unauthorized immigrants.290  Because natural and social resources are 
finite, the argument goes, a nation must distribute those items only to 
those who have obtained the community’s permission to enter.291 
 The theory of partial inclusion highlights the error of applying 
such distributive justice rationales to workplace rights.  Although 
society generally accepts the premise that when times are tight, the 
nation’s redistributive aims should serve its own,292 employment 
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protections are not limited goods.  For example, the notion of what it 
means to work in America is not diluted when unauthorized 
immigrants can sue for sexual harassment.  In fact, the exact opposite 
is true:  workplace identity is diluted when only a subset of the 
workforce can claim the bounty of employment protections.  Title VII 
expressly places plaintiffs in the role of private attorneys general in 
order to redress not only their “own injury but also [to] vindicate[] 
the important congressional policy against discriminatory 
employment practices.”293  This is a national project “of the highest 
priority.”294 
Likewise, the EEOC relies on “a broad sample of claims” from 
which to investigate and prosecute charges of discrimination.295   
A rule that diminishes this pool impairs the agency’s ability to achieve 
the collective goal of combating unlawful employment practices.   
The same is true for wage and labor protections, which depend on 
individual complaints in order to ensure better working conditions 
for all employees.296  Employment rights are not scarce resources.   
By limiting these rights—thereby creating false scarcity—the 
Supreme Court diminishes their value. 
C. Fostering Belonging 
The various notions of citizenship share the idea that, at its core, 
citizenship represents “belonging.”297  The feeling of belonging has 
both personal and social attributes.  Identity-based citizenship shapes 
the individual’s self-definition, while fostering solidarities within the 
nation-state among its members.298  Much of the current hostility 
toward unauthorized immigrants can be traced to identity-based 
citizenship.  There is a growing perception among Americans that 
unauthorized immigrants do not belong and do not want to belong.299 
Unauthorized immigrants increasingly live multiple lives, speak 
multiple languages, live in multiple countries, and form social, 
economic, and cultural ties to countries and non-state 
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communities.300  Initially viewing their stay in the United States as 
temporary, international migrants often see work in the United States 
as a way to attain economic and political benefits at home.301  They 
experience a “life without clear boundaries and without secure or 
singular identities,”302 giving rise to mixed loyalties.303 
Several immigration scholars have examined the “belonging” of 
noncitizens.304  For example, Adam Cox and Eric Posner have 
evaluated the issue in light of asymmetric information and the 
economics of contracts.305  Cox and Posner argue that noncitizens are 
less likely to make “country-specific investments,” such as developing 
relationships or learning new languages, if host countries do not 
commit to the immigrants’ continued residence.306  The more 
tenuous the nation-state’s commitment to the immigrant, the less 
likely she invests in the country.307  As a normative matter, Cox and 
Posner contend that, all things being equal, it is better for 
immigrants to make country-specific investments because they 
enhance the value of the relationship for countries and immigrants 
alike.308 
Cristina Rodríguez has explored the issue of belonging in light of 
increasing transnationalism.309  She argues that the new global order 
heightens the state’s need to create frameworks for belonging, even 
among immigrants who maintain a temporary intent to stay.310  This is 
true because what often begins as an intended short-term visit to the 
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United States becomes permanent as an immigrant forms ties to 
employers, social networks, and citizens.311  But even for those 
immigrants who never relinquish their intent to stay temporarily, 
American society should create opportunities for social investment.312  
Without any affiliation to the host country, immigrants become  
“a laboring class with a minimal stake in the long-term prosperity of 
the society.”313  This outcome undermines the state’s interest in 
encouraging residents to be good social actors.314 
Although Cox, Posner, and Rodríguez generally share the same 
objective of encouraging belonging among noncitizens, their 
methods for achieving that goal are discussed exclusively in terms of 
immigration policy.  Cox and Posner argue that countries can 
encourage country-specific investments through “ex ante” screening, 
which means offering some form of immigration status to  
“a particular immigrant on the basis of pre-entry information” early 
in the immigration process.315  Rodríguez contends that host 
countries can build “ties that anchor even the highly mobile migrant” 
through more liberal visa policies.316 
The theory of partial inclusion offers an additional method for 
encouraging identity-based citizenship through employment law.   
It explains how work and the enforcement of workplace rights 
provide unauthorized immigrants with meaningful connections to 
the communities in which they reside.  These connections benefit 
citizens by ensuring that all residents have a stake in the welfare of 
their society. 
Because it provides people with dignity, achievement, and personal 
identity, work itself can serve as a crucial pathway to citizenship.317  
The workplace is one of the few remaining centers of integration in 
the United States where people of different races, ethnicities, and 
                                                          
 311. See Cristina M. Rodríguez, Guest Workers and Integration:  Toward a Theory of 
What Immigrants and Americans Owe One Another, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 219, 267 
(2007) (noting that “intentions can and do change”); see also Maria L. Ontiveros, 
Noncitizen Immigrant Labor and the Thirteenth Amendment:  Challenging Guest Worker 
Programs, 38 U. TOL. L. REV. 923, 923 (2007) (arguing that even immigrants who 
intend to reside in the United States temporarily form ties to the host country). 
 312. Rodríguez, supra note 311, at 265–66. 
 313. Id. at 267. 
 314. Id. at 266; see also Martin, supra note 304, at 195 (discussing the need for 
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 315. Cox & Posner, supra note 305, at 812 (emphasis omitted). 
 316. Rodríguez, supra note 311, at 266–67. 
 317. See JUDITH N. SHKLAR, AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP:  THE QUEST FOR INCLUSION 1–2 
(1991) (discussing citizenship as “standing,” which is defined in part by one’s ability 
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statuses have the opportunity to engage in a shared experience.318  
Through employment, immigrants strengthen their associations with 
coworkers and worksites.  Viewed from this vantage, employment is 
not only a magnet drawing immigrants to the United States; it is a 
crucial anchor tying them to the community. 
Perhaps somewhat paradoxically, even immigration restrictionists 
should support extending rights of partial inclusion to nonmembers.  
As discussed above, the availability of employment rights does not 
affect a worker’s immigration-related incentives.319  Assuming that a 
large class of unauthorized immigrants will continue to reside in the 
country,320 the question becomes:  Does the community gain from 
legal restrictions that isolate this group or from mechanisms that 
encourage participation?  Undoubtedly, both citizens and immigrants 
gain when all residents have opportunities to invest in the community 
with a shared sense of common purpose.  Because such opportunities 
remain rare for unauthorized immigrants in other areas, the worksite 
is a unique place where this type of loyalty formation can take place. 
In addition to fostering a “feeling” of belonging, rights of partial 
inclusion encourage unauthorized immigrants to take actions that 
inure to the benefit of the entire workforce.  Immigration and 
constitutional scholars often describe civic republicanism as 
citizenship’s central virtue.321  Those who engage in a country’s 
political life are considered “good citizens[].”322  Although the 
discourse on this type of citizenship usually explains how the polity 
benefits from active participation, it also relates to identity formation.  
“We” belong because of our shared commitment to democratic 
principles and engagement in self-government.  In its strictest form, 
political citizenship does not apply to unauthorized immigrants.  
After all, they cannot vote in elections and have next to no political 
voice.323  Likewise, the notion of “workplace citizenship”—having an 
active voice in workplace governance—seems somewhat ill-fitting.324  
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Although unauthorized immigrants can join worker centers, unions, 
and employee committees,325 their lack of status often inhibits the 
kind of forceful participation described by the self-governance 
model.326 
Rights of partial inclusion offer another avenue for unauthorized 
immigrants to actively engage in the workplace.  The immigrant 
improves conditions for all workers by opposing illegal employment 
practices.  As with more traditional expressions of workplace 
citizenship, however, the fear of retaliation limits the immigrant’s 
willingness to exercise those rights.  The difference between rights of 
partial inclusion and traditional notions of workplace citizenship 
(i.e., workplace governance) relates to the timing of the citizenship 
activity.  Although actions such as joining unions or worker 
committees typically occur while the immigrant is still an employee, 
unauthorized immigrants need not exercise rights of partial inclusion 
until after the employment relationship has ended.  For example,  
if an employer fails to pay overtime to a group of unauthorized 
immigrants, the workers can delay suing for the unpaid wages until 
they have left the business that has committed the wage violation.  
Though the threat of deportation remains ever-present, the 
immigrant is somewhat more willing to exercise rights of partial 
inclusion given that the threat of retaliatory discharge no longer 
exists. 
In addition to timing, there is a difference in scale.  Traditional 
notions of workplace citizenship rely on a critical mass of immigrant 
workers exercising their voices collectively.  Although this is certainly 
possible,327 it remains a somewhat unlikely proposition given the 
highly stratified, low-wage sectors occupied by most unauthorized 
workers.328  In contrast, rights of partial inclusion do not require a 
large group of employees to act in order to bring about profound 
changes to the workplace.  For example, a single lawsuit brought by 
an unauthorized worker, whether individually or as a representative 
of a larger class, can drastically alter industry-wide practices in hiring, 
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promotion, and wage payments that affect both citizen and 
noncitizen employees. 
Even as they are marginalized in other social and political spheres, 
unauthorized immigrants “belong” to the workplace.  As such, rights 
of partial inclusion create avenues for participation among workers 
who will continue to reside in the country regardless of the 
employment protections they enjoy. 
CONCLUSION 
The rights of unauthorized workers remain in doubt.  Although 
functional arguments—administrative competence, remedial 
purpose, and statutory gutting—tend toward equalized rights, the 
conflict between employment inclusion and border exclusion 
remains.  The malleability of the Supreme Court’s incentives-based 
critique means that, at its most basic level, any employment remedy 
can be characterized as a “reward” for illegal behavior.  If the rewards 
rationale takes hold, the rights of unauthorized workers, which are 
now recognized in the breach, will not be recognized at all.   
This outcome should be evaluated with caution because it profoundly 
impacts our contemporary understanding of community. 
By describing the function workplace protections can serve in 
fostering belonging and participation among noncitizens, I recognize 
the limits of employment rights.  Abstract discussions of citizenship’s 
inclusiveness can mask the real-life exploitation and hardship many 
unauthorized workers endure.329  Indeed, even when the state 
recognizes the rights of unauthorized workers, the threat of 
deportation will always prevent a great many immigrants from 
exercising those formal rights.  Nonetheless, the movement toward 
exclusion—as reflected in the Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence 
on unauthorized workers—does even greater damage to the lives of 
immigrants and the communities in which they live and work. 
Just as immigration law defines the nation’s borders in order to 
prevent outsiders from accessing limited resources, the Supreme 
Court has attempted to restrict the fruits of workplace protections to 
law-abiding citizens.  But the workplace border does not serve the 
same goals as the national border.  In fact, the Court’s line-drawing 
harms those within the circle precisely because unauthorized 
immigrants are not allowed to enter.  By extending employment 
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protections to all workers, partial inclusion furthers the community’s 
self-definition, while providing unauthorized immigrants with a sense 
of belonging in a world increasingly focused on their exclusion. 
